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PACKAGE DEAL: 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF RECYCLING STANDARDS FOR PACKAGING 
IN MASSACHUSETTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report examines the economics of recycling. It consists of three related parts. Part One compares 
the costs of recycling with the costs of landf i ig  and incineration for a representative ton of materials found in 
municipal solid waste. In Part Two, we analyze the dynarnics of recycling markets and determine that recycling 
standards are the critical mechanism for remedying deficicncies in demand for recovered materials. Part Three 
of the report evaluates the likely impacts of Massachusetts recycling standards for packaging (RSP), taking into 
account both microeconomic and macroeconomic effects. 
PART ONE. RECYCLING PAYS, BUT BY HOW MUCH? 
It is widely recognized that the recycling of materials confers a net benefit to society, but just how large 
is the social benefit? Casual estimates are typically basc,d on the revenue from recycled materials plus the 
avoided tipping fee for incinerating or landfilling of the (otherwise waste) material. However, tipping fees bear 
no necessary relationship to the actual social costs of solid waste disposal, and the recycling of materials 
imposes costs that must also be included in the ralculatioii. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that current market conditions and prices for recycled 
materials prevail. In fact, as we argue in Part Two, recycling standards for packaging are required precisely in 
order to realize this assumption, by maintaining viable markets for recycled materials. 
The net social benefits of recycling can be derived from five elements: 
(1) Revenues From Recyclers for SeDarated Materials: The current market values for separated and 
processed paper, glass, plastics, steel, and aluminum, adjusted for the projected composition in the year 
2OOO of a typical ton of Massachusetts municipal solid waste, yield an estimated revenue of $49/ton. 
Plus: 
Minus: 
Plus: 
Plus: 
(2) a s :  Since the use of recycled materials reduces the need for 
virgin materials, the cost of government subsidies to producers of those materials-consisting of tax 
benefits, below cost sale of natural resources, and uncompensated technical support-is avoided. The 
magnitude of the subsidy is estimated to be approximately $3/ton. 
(3) Costs of Collectine and SeDaratinP hiatetials for kecvcling: The capital and operating costs needed 
for the collection and separation of recycled materials--based on current garbage collection costs, 
additional costs associated with collecting recyclables, and the experience of the Springfield Materials 
Recycling Facility--is estimated to be $%/ton. 
(4) Avoided DisDosal Costs of Incineration (for that share of municbal solid waste that is incinerated): 
The Commonwealth predicts that, by 1992, the ratio of incineration to landfilling will be 70% to 30%. 
Adding capital costs, Federal tax subsidies, the cost of remedial poltution control equipment, operating 
costs, ash disposal costs, and the social cost of environmental harm and disamenities, and subtracting 
revenues from the sale of electricity produced from solid waste combustion, yields a net cost of 
$289/ton of waste incinerated in Massachusetts facilities. 70% of that figure provides the avoided 
disposal cost of $202/ton. 
(5) Avoided DisDosal Costs of Landfilline (for that share of municiDal solid waste t hat is landfilled): 
Capital costs, operating costs, clean-up and post-closure care costs, additional costs of impending 
landfill regulations, and the social cost of environmental harm and disamenities come to $U)9/ton. . 
30% of that figure provides the avoided disposal cost of $63/ton. 
i 
Based on the preceding estimates, we are now able to calculate the net social benefits of recycling, as 
applied to packaging material. 
Recycling Revenues: 
Recycling Costs: 
Net Recycling Revenue: 
Avoided Subsidy to Virgin Material: 
Avoided Cost/Ton of Incineration 
Avoided Cost/Ton of Landfilling 
(for the share of waste incinerated) 
(for the share of waste landfilled) 
Net Benefit of Recycling: 
$(-37)/ton 
$ 3/ton 
$ 202/ton 
$ 63/ton 
$ 23l/ton 
Appendix A of the report subjects the estimates cited above to a sensitivity analysis, in which each 
variable influencing the net benefit of recycling is allowed to assume a range of possible values. This analysis 
demonstrates how robust the $231/ton estimate is. With few exceptions, substituting the high and low values of 
a variable in place of the baseline value still results in a net benefit of recycling of between $200 and $265. 
PART TWO: WHY RECYCLING STANDARDS FOR PACKAGING ARE NECESSARY 
This section answers the following two related questions: 
(1) If the benefits of recycling are so substantial ($231/ton), won't private markets provide the desired 
expansion of recycling activity (to its optimum level)? 
(2) W h y  are recycling standardr for packaging (RSP), or any other form of govemment intervention, 
needed? 
Market imnerfections d a m e  recvcline efforts. For a market to operate efficiently, economic agents 
must bear the full marginal social costs (and realize the full marginal social benefits) associated with their 
actions. Imperfections in solid waste disposal markets prevent this condition from being realized. 
Because the price for solid waste disposal does not reflect the environmental harm and disamenities 
accompanying such activities, solid waste generators are able to escape these costs. The other source of the 
market failure arises from the way in which solid waste collection and disposal are financed. Local government 
typically finances market costs of collection and disposal from general tax revenues, making a household's 
marginal tax burden of discarding an additional unit of trash effectively zero, even though the associated market 
cost is not. 
Example: Suppose a town contains 6OOO households, each paying $400 a year in taxes to 
collect and dispose of the 6OOO pounds of solid waste it generates. The marginal cost to the 
town of each additional pound of trash is 6.7 cents, but the cost borne by each household in tax 
payments for each additional pound discarded is only 6.7/6000 cents, or approximately 1/1OOO 
of a penny. 
This discrepancy distorts incentives for individuals to reduce the amount of material they discard and 
results in an inadequate amount of recycling from a social perspective. 
ii 
Government-mandated seDaration and collection of recvclable materials has fatal limitations. Until 
recovered materials are actually reused-until they are converted into new products and sold to new customers-- 
no meaningful recycling has been achieved. It is the inability of government-mandated waste separation and 
collection programs to remedy deficiencies in demand for the recovered materials that will quickly cause them 
to fail. Some cities have already discovered that no markets exist for their recyclables. 
Fixisting demand-side Dolicies are ineffective. Economic charges and t a m  (on household waste 
disposal, packaging, or virgin materials) face insurmountable practical problems concerning sccuracy, fairness, 
effectiveness, and collection costs. State procurement constitutes too small a percentage of packaging sales to 
remedy deficient private demand for recyclable materials. Unconditional product bans eliminate the possibility 
of recycling the banned material or packaging and provide no additional demand for recovely of the material 
that replaces it; historically, unconditional bans have been applied to isolated materials a d  packaging in a 
relatively unsystematic manner, limiting their effect. 
Recvcline standards for Dackaeine are the mechanism critical to remedvinv deficiencies in demand for 
recovered materials. Since packaging is the largest single source of municipal solid waste (MSW), comprising 
one-third of MSW, it is there where recycling standards would, in all likelihood, be most productively applied. 
RSP will stimulate recycling demand for the major types of materials used in packaging--paper, glass, plastics, 
steel, and aluminum. These materials account for 60% of MSW. 
RSP should contain at least two provisions: that packaging consist of a given percsntage of recycled 
material, and, alternatively, that packaging be made of recyclable materials (those which achieve a specified 
statewide recycling rate for all uses of the material). An important feature of the two plovisions is their 
synergy, which causes the demand for recovered packaging materials to ratchet up. 
The function of government should not be to redace the market but to organize and maintain a market 
that is not indeDendentlv sustainable. Mandatory separation and collection, education of consumers and 
businesses, information clearinghouse functions, and state procurement take on added h p o r t b c e  when 
complemented by RSP. The combination of these activities can provide the stability in recycling markets that 
private investors require and help develop a large-scale recycling infrastructure. 
PART THREE THE EFFECT OF RECYCLING STANDARDS FOR PACKAGING IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
Microeconomic Effects: The Benefits and Costs of  RSP 
(1) Net Social Benefits of Increased Recvcline of Packagne Material Due tG RS?: Althaugh less than 
10% of Massachusetts's 6.6 million annual tons of MSW is currently recycled, a larger proportion of packaging 
discards (estimated at 2.23 million tons) is recycled: approximately 16% by weight, or 357,000 tons per year. 
For purposes of analysis, we assume that an aggressive, but realistic, RSP program can and will 
increase the recycling rate for discarded Dackaging to 50%. Not only have other countries met or exceeded this 
level, but most packaging materials now used in the U.S. have already reached or are anticipated to reach 50% 
recycling. 
For all packaging in Massachusetts to comply with RSP by consisting of 50% recycled materials would 
J require a total of 1.115 million tons of MSW to be recycled, or an increase of 758,000 tons per year from current 
(We argue below that, for economic reasons, most additional recycled material processing and 0 levels. 
formulation will occur in-state.) Earlier, we calculated the ne 
iii 
the aforementioned benefits from recycled packaging. 
For example, businesses might choose to comply with RSP by using recyclable packaging material- 
thos-: that are achieving a statewide recycling rate of 50% from al l  uses. If all packajng were to complv with beN this criteria% half the 4 million tons of these materials discarded annually in Massachusetts w7;ilrlfiave -to be 
*;4&''? recycled; just 700,000 tons are estimated to be recycled currently. We previously estimated the impact of the 
recycled content standard at 758,000 additional tons of recycling; satisfying the recyclability standard (2 million 
tons) would therefore require another 542,000 tons annually. Using $231/ton as the net social benefit af recycling 
packaging matend the potential leveraged benefits of RSP due to the recyclability criterion are approximately an 
addit !mal $125 million per yeat. 
Obviously, if some packaging complies with the recycled content standard and the remainder with the 
recyclability standard, then the total social benefits will fall somewhere between $175 million and $300 million 
annually. 
(3)PSP COmP liance Costs are the additional costs that firms incur to make their packaging meet 
packaghg recycling standards. We expect these compliance costs to be small for a number of reasons, 
including: 
some packaging is already in compliance with RSP; 
* h s  modify their packaging, on average, every two to three years, so that RSP compliance will be 
part of the regular process of packaging revision; 
camp1 mnre 
Cost 
* packagers will aggressively market their compliant packaging, reducing packaging buyers' need to 
spend resources seeking that information. 
In addition, two by-products of RSP compliance will tend to minimize, or offset, RSP compliance costs: 
*joint production eflciencies: the re-evaluation of production processes needed to achieve compliance 
with RSP will allow some firms to introduce simultaneous productivity improvements at the same time; ,? 
* p h @ n g  and recycling innovations: government regulation with the characteristics of RSP has been 
shown to stimulate the performance of industry. 
include government's costs of developing, supervising, and enforcing 
an RSP program, as well as the costs businesses incur to verify and demonstrate their compliance. Because of 
its heavy reliance on market solutions, we anticipate that RSP will keep the government's administrative costs to 
a modest level. Competitors can be expected to challenge unwarranted exemption requests, while increased 
recyclbg will reduce governmental costs associated with other environmental programs. Retdilers, meanwhile, 
w i l l s m d  contract language - requiring their suppliers to assume liability for any and all - costs and 
penalties e i n 8  from delivered packGg.in violation of RSP, 
(5) Possibilitv of Product Withdrawals or Shortass: Simply put, there will be no vacant shelves in 
Massachusetts as the result of an RSP program. Although this prospect is raised by industry every time it is 
faced with stringent regulation, the functioning of economic markets prevents product withdrawals or shortages. 
Manufacturers of compliant packaging will rush in to fill the void left by non-compliant competitors, and 
packaging entrepreneurs will develop novel packaging solutions that better incorporate the new realities of the 
marketplace. 
I' I 
(1) General Caveats: The analysis of any policy requires tracing the long-run consequences of that 
policy for all economic sectors, not merely the immediate effects of the policy or the effects on only one 
economic sector. For example, 8ome manufacturers of non-compliant packaging will lose business and 
ewloye_es. But those losses will be offset by the additional business and employment created for 
manufacturers of recyclable or recycled-content packaging: recycling standards will result not in a loss of jotis, 
but in a diversion of jobs. -I 
It should also be understood that just because an economic agent is "affected by a policy or change in 
economic activity doesn't necessarily mean that the impact is negative. The purpose of the recycling standards 
is precisely to "affect" businesses and households by providing incentives to alter behavior in ways that promote 
recycling. 
(2) Real and ImDlicit Tax Reductions: Everv dollar an RSP Droeram saves Massachusetts in solid 
waste dispo2al costs dire-slates into a dollar reduction in tax burden for Massachusetts taxpayers. 
Of the estimated $175 - $300 million net social benefit of an RSP program, approximately 42% 
associated with the avoided out-of-pocket costs and the remaining 58% is derived from the avoided imputed 
costs of solid waste disposal. Thus, the net social benefits of an RSPprogram translate into a tax reduction of $75 
- $125 million annually for Massachusetts businesses and householk, and an additional implicit tax beneflt of 
$200 - $175 million (which may appear in such areas as reductions in environmental hazards and their 
associated health and work-loss consequences). 
These real and implicit tax reductions brought about by an RSP program All serve to stimulate the 
Massachusetts economy and employment in Massachusetts. Tax reductions (without corresponding loss of 
services) will attract both workers and industry to the state. 
(3) Industry-SDecific Effects: An RSP program will stimulate certain industries and cause others to 
contract. The stimulated activities will be conducted primarily in Massachusetts, while the industries adversely 
affected are primarily out-of-state. Although numerical projections of job gains and losses are necessarily 
uncertain and subject to analytic abuse, we are confident in concluding that recycling standards will have a 
positive effect on employment in Massachusetts. (Rough estimates of Job gains are included, where relevant, in 
footnotes to this report.) 
Our reasoning with respect to each affected industry is as follows: 
Because materials collection and sorting are much more labor intensive than landfilling and 
incineration, the shift of economic activity to these local industries will create additional employment in 
Massachusetts. 
Only about 18,000 Massachusetts manufacturing jobs are packaging-related. These jobs will not be lost 
as a result of recycling standards, but there will be some diversion of job activity to recycled-content or 
recyclable packaging. 
The packaging indztsoy itself employs approximately 22,000 workers in Massachusetts. Some packagers 
will be positively affected by RSP; some negatively. But these impacts are inherently off-setting: one packager's 
loss signals a competitor's gain, with the net effect on Massachusetts employment small. 
Most importantly, however, the shift to recycled and recyclable packaging will boost Massachusetts 
employment in all materials processing and packaging-related businesses. The amount of economic activity in 
Massachusetts involving virgin materials maction and processing (such as forestry and mining) is extremely 
small. Thus, any loss of economic activity in this area will have only a negligible effect on the state economy. 
Conversely, RSP-induced stimulation of recycled materials fomulating and processing should have a substantial 
V 
\ 
positive impact on employment. Because of the relatively high cost of transporting materials, additional 
formulation and processing will, for the most part, happen locally. In-state packagers who quickly adapt to the 
new market conditions will also enjoy competitive advantages. 
(4) -5: The successful implementation of RSP in Massachusetts would 
surely provide the impetus for adoption of this program in other states. In addition, the pervasive benefits of 
recycling standards will ,ict to reduce materials and production costs throughout the economy, thereby 
improving the competitiveness of Massachusetts and American industry. Finally, recycling standards for 
packaging will provide the means for a successful transition from a throw-away society to one that respects and 
values its resources. 
vi 
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PART ONE: 
RECYCLING PAYS, BUT BY HOW MUCH? 
It is widely recognized that the recycling of materials confers a net benefit to society, 
but just how large is the social benefit? Casual estimates are typically based on the 
revenue from recycled materials plus the avoided tipping fee for incineration or landfilling 
of the (otherwise waste) material, However, tipping fees bear no necessary relationship to 
the actual social costs of solid waste disposal, and the recycling of materials imposes costs 
that must also be included in the calculations. 
Our objective, in the analysis that follows, is to determine the magnitude of the 
social benefits of recycling. For the purposes of this analysis, we shall assume that, broadly 
speaking, current market conditions and prices for recycled materials prevail. In fact, as 
demonstrated in Part Two of this study, recycling standards for packaging (RSP) are 
required precisely in order to realize this assumption (that is, a major reason recycling 
packaging standards are needed is to maintain a viable market for recycled materials). 
Since our overall policy interests here concern recycling standards for packaging, we 
shall focus on the benefits of recycling per composite ton of packaging material. Note, 
however, that compliance with RSP can normally be achieved in ways other than by 
increasing the recyclability of packaging material. For example, two potential methods of 
compliance are to increase the recycled content of packaging or to increase the recycling 
rate of the types of material used in packaging (e.g., paper)--including non-packaging 
applications (e.g., newspaper)--above some threshold level. For this reason, recycling rates 
of materials used h packq@g==b~th ifi packaghg iioii-paekaghg applieatior~--wiH be 
relevant in the subsequent analysis. For convenience, our use of the term "package 
recycling" will, unless otherwise specified, refer to all possible packaging effects of RSP, to 
encompass the recyclability of packaging, the recycled content of packaging, and the 
recycling of materials used in packaging. 
The net social benefits of recycling can be derived from five elements: (1) the 
revenues from recyclers for separated materials; plus (2) the avoided subsidy to virgin 
materials; minus (3) the costs of collecting and separating materials for recycling; plus 
(4) the avoided disposal costs of incineration (for that share of municipal solid waste that is 
incinerated); plus (5)  the avoided disposal costs of landfilling (for that share of municipal 
solid waste that is landfilled).l Each element depends on a variety of factors that are likely 
lWe have attempted, to the extent possible, to capture al l  the social benefits and costs of recycling, 
even though these benefits and costs may not be reflected in market transactions. Thus, for example, 
government subsidies to develop virgin materials and the externalities generated by incineration and landfilling 
are included in the subsequent calculations. However, in order to prevent the analysis from becoming 
1 
\ , 
to vary over time and from site to site.2 Because of data limitations and other empirical 
difficulties, some estimates are based on simplifying (but, we believe, reasonable) 
assumptions.3 Therefore, these calculations should be viewed as merely indicative of the 
actual social costs rather than as precise and definitive estimates. To avoid complicating 
the discussion unnecessarily, the ensuing text presents only our best estimate of the 
magnitude of each variable affecting the net social benefits of recycling, culminating in a 
single point estimate of the net social benefits of recycling. However, in Appendix A, we 
consider a range of possible values these variables may assume, re-estimate the net social 
benefits of recycling under these alternative assumptions, and evaluate the sensitivity of our 
results to changes in the values used in the calculati ms. 
A. TheRe venues from Recv cling 
Recall that our focus here is on the recycling of packaging materials in its broadest 
sense, to include both the recycling of packaging aid the recycling of the types of material 
used in packaging. The composition of packaging by material by weight is provided in 
Coluxmi (b) of Table 1.4 These percentages correspond very closely to the projected 
intractable, we did not consider the effect of externalities in primary materials extraction and processing relative 
to those in secondary materials collection and processing. One potential example of an externality in these 
markets is the cons-mptkm af depbt&!e emrgy resewcec. Skce materids recovered through recycling 
generally use substantially less energy than that required for the development of equivalent virgin materials 
(Office of Technology Assessment [1989], pages 142-184, Kovacs [1988], pages 543-544, and Stauffer [1989]), to 
the extent that the price of energy does not fully measure its cost of production (including the scarcity value of 
depletable resources used in energy production), the net benefits of recycling will be correspondingly 
understated in our calculations. The magnitude of the underestimation could be substantial. 
2Whenever possible, we base our estimates on Massachusetts data or projections. Otherwise, in order 
3We 'should also note that, except in calculating the revenues from recycling, we did not disaggregate 
our analysis on a material by material basis. Thus, our estimates may not be applicable to a specific type of 
packaging material in isolation. For example, collection costs for plastics will be higher than our estimates 
because a ton of plastics takes up more space relative to other packaging materials. For similar reasons, the 
cost of laudfillkg a ton of plastics will be higher than our estimates, which are based on a composite ton of 
packaging material. 
4By comparison, packaging materials currently comprise the following percentages by weight of 
municipal solid waste: paper, 36%; glass, 8%; plastics, 7%; steel, 8.5%; and aluminum, .5%. (Source: Ofice of 
Technology Assessment [1989], page 5.) 
of preference, we rely on national averages or on data from other states. 
2 
(a) HATE RI A 
Paper 
G1 ass 
P1 as t i cs 
Steel 
A1 umi num 
TABLE 1 
REVENUES FROM RECYCLED PACKAGING MATERIALS 
55% 
22% 
11% 
5% 
3% 
% OF A”‘ E C Y C L E D ~  
53% 
23% 
10% 
13.5% 
.5% 
(4 (“1 x (4 PRICEITON OMPOSITE 
$153 $7.95 
$304 $6.90 
$1805 $18.00 
$756 $10.12 
$11707 $5.85 
$48.82 
lSource: Franklin Associates (19@a)c 
*Source: Massachusetts Solid Waste Master Plan (1989), pages 81-87. 
3Recycled paper prices/ton range from $-30 to $35 for newsprint; to $40 to $50 for cardboard; to $185 
to $200 for Xerox ptper. Sources: Barry (1989), Boston Business Journal (June 18, 1990), Massachusetts Solid 
Waste Master Plan (1989), and h e r d i n g  (1990). 
4Recycled glass prices/ton range from $15 to $60 for clear glass to $15 to $35 for green or amber glass. 
Office of Technology Assessment (1989) and New York State, Department of Economic 
sRecycled plastics prices/ton range from $40 to $140 for PET to $100 to $580 for HDPE. Sources: 
Sources: 
Development (1987). 
Recycling Times (reported in New York State, Department of Economic Development [1987]) and Wirka 
(1988). 
6Recycled steel prices/ton range from $50 to $100. Sources: Resource Recycling (March 1990) and 
Office of Technology Assessment (1989). 
’Recycled aluminum prices/ton range from $lo00 to $WO. Source: Office of Technology Assessment 
(1989). 
composition (in the year 2000) of a typical ton of recycled materialL-for those materials 
used in packaging-by weight in Column (c) of Table 1.6 Because these percentages are so 
similar, we shall use the latter projections to represent the overall composition of recycled 
packaging by material by weight (to be multiplied by the price/ton for those materials in 
the last column of Table 1). 
The price/ton paid by recyclers for a given (separated and processed) packaging 
material is difficult to estimate because each class of material has so many grades and 
attributes that affect price.7 In addition, the price for a given grade of rr,aterial is 
susceptible to wide variations due to short-term shifts in supply or demand. Rough 
estimates of the average price/ton of a given packaging material are provided in Column 
(d) of Table 1. Multiplying these prices/ton by the composition of recycled packaging 
material by weight (from Column [c]) yields a composite price/ton for recycled packaging 
material of approximately $49 at the bottom of the last column of Table 1.8 Thus, our 
estimate of the average revenue per ton of recycled packaging material is $@/ton. 
B. The Avoided Subsidv to Virfin Materials 
Virgin materials producers (for mining, timber, and petroleum, for example) enjoy 
(1) tax benefits, such as depletion allowances and special treatment of income, (;!) below 
3Note that the best measure of recycling rates would include all (interfirm) industrial recycling of 
materials, even those which do not become part of municipal solid waste. However, because of data limitations, 
most measures of recycling rates are based solely on recovery of materials that enter the solid waste stream. 
For this reason, throughout the study, we too will be forced to use the conventional, but inferior, MSW measure 
%‘hese percentages should not be confused with current recycling rates for these materials: paper, 
22%; glass, 10%; plastics, 1%; steel, 21%; and aluminum 25%. (Sources: Franklin Associates [1988a] and 
Oace  of Technology Assessment [1989], pages 161-162.) Nor should they be confused with the current 
composition of a typical ton of recycled material used in packaging, which--based on the current recycling rate 
of these materials and their share of the municipal waste s t r eam4  approximately as follows: paper, 74%; 
glass, 8%; plastics, 1%; steel, 16%; and aluminum, 1%. 
7For example, there are 49 grades of wastepaper and 31 other specialty grades (Kovacs [1988], page 
597). As another example, the price of steel in recycling markets depends on whether the scrap metal has been 
de tinned. 
8Note that average recycling revenues currently range from $5/ton to $25/ton (various sources, 
including Allan, Platt, and Morris [1989], New York State Department of Economic Development [1987], and 
telephone conversations with Springfield and Rhode Island MRFs). The discrepancy between our estimate and 
current recycling figures is explained by the dominance of paper in current recycling (over 75% at the MRFs) 
and the depressed price for newsprint (as low as $-30) during some periods in some markets. Note also that a 
negative price for recycled material (that is, paying recyclers to take the material) is certainly plausible if 
alternative methods of disposing of the material are even more costly. 
of iecy.&g 
4 
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cost sale of natural resources by the government, and (3) uncompensated technical support 
and services, such as provided by the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior, all 
of which are not available to producers of recycled materials. These government benefits 
subsidize the cost of virgin raw materials and constitute a type of social cost not reflected in 
market prices. The use of recycled materials, in effect, reduces the use of virgin materials 
a m h e  social cost represented by these subsidies to producers of the virgin 
materials. 
The size of the government subsidy to virgiii materials is difficult to calculate. 
rude estimates of the magnitude of the tax subsidy are equal to approximately 1 percent 
of the price of paper, 2 percent of the price of sleel, and 5 percent of the price of 
aluminum.9 These estimates do not take into account the -I__._ non-taxsubsidies, but - these may_ 
be offset, more or less, by severance taxes10 and the fact that recent changes in the tax code 
have tended to reduce tax benefits provided to the developers of virgin natural resources.ll 
Assuming that the size of the government subsidy is only about 2 percent of the 
price of virgin materials and that the price of a composite ton of virgin materials used in 
packaging is approximately $150, we estimate that each ton of recycled material eliminates 
a government subsidy to virgin materials of approximately $3. 
i 
C. The Costs Of Reqc  ling 
Estimates of the cost of collecting discarded materials for waste disposaZ range from 
$35 to $65 per ton.= We shall assume a mid-point figure of $50 per ton. In comparison to 
these costs, the process of coiiecting and separating materiais for recycling often imposes 
additional economic costs. These additional costs are particularly likely to arise in cases 
“rhese estimates were developed by the Environmental Law Jnstitute (1976), as reported in Franklin 
lol‘roducers of virgin materials must sometimes pay additional taxes. The most prominent of these is a 
severance tax levied, usually at the state level, on either the quantity or value of output. However, there is some 
evidence that, even in those cases where a severance tax is levied, the tax has only one-third to one-tenth the 
impact on market price that the depletion allowance has. See Tietenberg (1988), page 186, and Anderson 
(1978), page 23. 
Associates (1988b). 
%ee Franklin Associates (1988b), pages 7-9. 
12See Tufts University (1988), page 11; Office of Technology Assessment (1989), page 62; and Denison 
and Ruston (l990), page 140. Note that these collection costs do not affect the magnitude of the net social 
benefits of recycling since they arise both for waste disposal and recycling. However, they would be relevant in 
other contexts, such as in calculating the net social benefits of source reduction (e.g., reducing the amount of 
packaging). 
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where recyclable materials are not user separated and collected by individual type of 
recyclable material. Our estimate of the additional recycling costs in these cases is derived 
from data concerning the Springfield Materials Recycling Facility (MRF).13 
As part of its materials recycling plan for the Western Region of Massachusetts 
(served by the Springfield MRF), the Commonwealth provided the communities in the 
region a total of $2,100,000 to defray their additional collection costs for recyclable 
materials. Most of the additional costs were for special collection trucks and collection 
c0ntdners.1~ Assuming a five-year life for this equipment and that the Springfield MRF 
processes 60,000 tons of recyclables per year (or 300,000 tons in five years), the average 
additional capital cost per ton for the collection equipment is $7. In addition, the 
investment in collection equipment either requires financing or diverts assets that could 
earn interest or otherwise be profitably emp1oyed.s Assuming a real interest rate of 6 
UUnless otherwise specified, the information concerning the Springfield MRF was obtained in a 
telephone conversation with Steve Ellis of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection on July 
30,1990. 
l*o the extent that the special collection trucks replace other solid waste collection vehicles, the 
reported costs overestimate recycling collection costs (since the costs of the trucks replaced should be 
subtracted). On the other hand, to the extent that the funding provided by the Commonwealth does not fully 
compensate the participating communities for the additional collection costs they incur, the reported costs 
underestimate the additional collection costs due to recycling. 
BThe issue of opportunity cost arises in the case of capital investments or whenever the benefits of an 
activity are realized in a time period different from the time period in which the associated costs are incurred. 
The interest charges in these cases will be estimated in relation to the timing of activities (and therefore relative 
to equivalent operating costs, which would not incur interest charges) according to the following formula: 
n 1 
where C is total interest charges; i is the real interest rate (the nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation); 
n is the life of the investment and P is the size of the investment. The average interest charge per ton is 
The logic of the equation can be illustrated by the following simplified example. Suppose a material 
costs $5 per unit to produce and 20 units are produced each year. Two years' worth of output would cost $200, 
payable when the units are produced. Assuming a conthuous flow of output, the midpoint payment for the fust 
year's costs occurs after 1/2 of the first year, and the midpoint payment for the second year's costs occurs after 1 
1/2 years. By comparison, suppose production of a material requires an initial investment of $200, payable 
before production begins. Hypothetically, we can apportion the $200 equally among the years of production, or 
$100 of investment for each of the two years' production. Then, the interest costs for the fust year of 
production, when co moared to t he continuous flow examo le, is $100 multiplied by the real interest rate for the 
additional half year duration between investment and production, and the interest costs for the second year of 
production, when co ed to t he cont inuous flow examo le, is $100 multiplied by the real interest rate for the 
addition 1 1/2 years duration between investment and production. Total interest costs are the sum of the 
interest costs for each year of the productive life of the investment. 
C/tons. 
6 
percent per annum,l6 the average interest charge is $1 per ton.17 Thus, the total 
additional collection cost, including interest charges, per ton of recyclables is $8.18 
The additional cost of separating recyclables is made up of two components: capital 
costs and operating costs. The cost of constructing the Springfield MRF was $5,200,000. 
Assuming a 20-year life for the facility (in which 1,200,000 tons of recyclable material will 
be processed), the $5,200,000 capital investment imposes a per ton cost of approximately 
$4. Assuming a real interest rate of 6 percent, the interest charges per ton for the capital 
investment are an additional $4. Thus the total capital cost including interest, as reflected 
by the Springfield MRF, is $8/ton.19 
The cost of operating the Springfield MRF involves the operating costs of the 
building, the operator fee, and an operator revenue incentive. The operating costs of the 
building are $480,000 per year, or $8 per ton of recyclables. The operator fee is 
approximately $14 per ton. The operator revenue incentive provides the operator w,th 35 
percent of the revenues in excess of $29.88 per ton for recyclables and requires the 
operator to absorb 35 percent of the revenue shortfall below $29.88 per ton. Since we have 
estimated that the revenue per ton for recycled packaging material will be approximately 
$49, the associated operator revenue incentive will be equal to $7 per ton.20 Hence, the 
total operating cost of processing materials for recycling, based on the experience of  the 
Springfield MRF, will be $8/ton plus $14/ton plus $7/ton, or a total of $29/ton of 
recyclables. 
L6The 6 percent red interest rate is based on a nominai interest rate of i0 percent per annum and a 
17Applying the preceding formula yields interest charges for a five-year investment equal to 16.07 
percent of the capital invested. For the $2,100,000 investment in collection equipment, the interest charges total 
$337,571. Dividing by the 300,OOO tons of recyclables yields an interest charge per ton of approximately $1. 
18Some confirmation that this estimate falls within an acceptable range was provided by Jamie Hill, 
Research Analyst for the National Solid Waste Management Association, during a telephone conversation on 
October 23,1990. She reported that, based on rough figures from a sample of communities, the additional cost 
of curbside collection for recycling ranged from $8 to $32 per household per year, which is approximately 
equivalent to from $3 to $12 per ton. 
19Estimates based on the Rhode Island MRF, which cost $4,soO,OOO to construct and has a capacity of 
51,000 tons of recyclables per year (Glenn [1990]), would be virtually identical. 
*ONote, however, that the current revenue per ton received by the Springfield MRF is approximately 
$12, so that the operator revenue incentive currently requires the operator to pay back the Commonwealth 
approximately $6 per ton (a negative cost). For reasons indicated earlier, current recycling revenues 
underestimate projected future recycling revenues per ton. 
rate of inflation of 4 percent per annum. 
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Combining the additional collection costs of $8/ton with the additional separation 
costs of $S/ton for capital costs and $29/ton for operating costs yields a total additional 
cost for collecting and separating recyclables of $45/ton. However, recall that not all 
recyclables require additional collection and separation costs. Recyclable materials that 
are user separated and collected by individual type of recyclable material should be no 
more costly to process than waste material. Many recyclables from commercial activity- 
such as cor xgated boxes-fit this description. As a result, we shall assume that only 80% 
of recyclabl es require additional collection and separation costs. The additional collection 
and separation cost for the average recyclable material is therefore $36/ton (that is, 80 
percent of $45/ton). Finally, the total cost of collecting and separating material for 
recycling is $50/ton for the basic collection costs for discarded materials plus the additional 
$36/ton for collecting and separating materials for recycling, yielding a sum of $86/ton. 
. 
D. The Awided Disposal Costs of Incineration 
One of the social benefits from recycling is the avoidance of waste disposal costs. 
We assume that all packaging material wastes will either be incinerated or landfilled. In 
this section, we calculate the social costs of waste disposal by incineration; in the following 
section, we calculate the social costs of waste disposal by landfill. Since the 
Commonwealth predicts that, by 1992, the ratio of solid waste that is incinerated relative to 
landfilled will be 70 percent to 30 percent (Massachusetts Solid Waste Master Plan [ 19891, 
page 18), we shall assume the same proportions in estimating the avoided costs of 
packaging material waste disposal. 
In addition to solid waste collection costs of $50/ton, the total social costs of 
incineration can be derived from seven separate elements: (1) capital costs; plus (2) the 
Federal tax subsidy; plus (3) the costs of additional (remedial) pollution control 
equipment; plus (4) operating costs; minus (5) revenues from the sale of electricity 
produced from solid waste combustion; plus (6) the costs of incinerator ash disposal; plus 
(7) the social cost of environmental harm and disamenities. * 
The capital costs and daily capacity of the nine Massachusetts solid waste 
combustion facilities are presented in Table 2. The capacity of these nine facilities, 
summarized in Column (b), totals 9,712 tons/day of solid waste. Assuming an efficiency 
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(a) 
LOCATION 
Rochester 
M i  1 bury  
N. Andover 
Haverhi 11 
P i  t t s f i e l d  
Spr i  n g f  i e l  d 
F a l l  R i v e r  
Lawrence 
Saugus 
TOTAL 
TABLE 2 
COST OF MASSACHUSETTS INCINERATORS1 
(d) 
TAX-EXEMPT BONDS 
(4 
COST 
(b) 
CAPACITY 
(TONS/DAY) (MILLIONS) (MILLIONS) 
1800 
1500 
1500 
1650 
240 
360 
240 
922 
1500 
$208 
$205 
$197 
$268.8 
$ 11 
$ 333 
8 54 
$ 905 
m 
$150 
$ .325 
$160 
$1842 
$ 6.2 
$ 312 
$ 0  
LE 
$ 58.2 
9712 $1065.8 $624.725 
lSource: LeBlanc (1988), pages 19 and 35. 
2Source: Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection memo, April 1990. 
3Source: Telephone conversation with representatives of the Springfield facility on October 22,1990. 
'bource: Telephone conversation with Raymond Reynolds, City Auditor for the City of Fall River, on 
%ource: Telephone conversation with Jim Richie, representative of Refuse Fuels Associates, on 
October 24,1990. 
October 24,1990. 
factor of 90 percent21 and multiplying by 365 days, we calculate that the capacity/year for 
these Massachusetts incinerators is 3,190,392 tons. Over their expected 20 year lifetimes, 
they will incinerate 63,807,840 tons of solid waste.2 The total capital cost of these nine 
facilities, presented in Column (c) of Table 2, is $1,065.8 million or approximately $17 per 
ton. Assuming a real rate of interesl of 6 percent,a the interest charges for these 
incinerators is $15/ton. Thus, the total capital cost including interest for these seven 
incinerators is $32/ton of solid waste. 
(2) Federal Tax Subsidy 
The Federal tax structure provides a subsidy to incinerator developers in the form of 
accelerated depreciation and Investment Tax Credits. Again, this subsidy imposes social 
costs that are not measured in market prices. The magnitude of this Federal tax benefit 
has been estimated to equal $10 per ton D f  incinerated solid waste (LeBlanc [1988], page 
19). 
(3) Installation of Pollution Contrd EauiDment 
An additional cost of incineration, for some facilities, is the remedial installation of 
pollution control equipment. For example, the Saugus plant requires the installation of 
acid gas scrubbers, at a cost of $128 million (Armerding [1990]), or approximately $13 per 
&.Al. "NO.-.C, L'Ahhough the p&ssachiiseiis Depa-iTiieni of E--:--- n l v u u r r i l i G u L a  4 a u t c I b L a u u  ~ S S G ~ ~ S  +'a eGct'n- ,.+.-.1 D-ll+anr:r\.. 
combustion facilities will operate at 95 percent efficiency (Commonwealth of Massachusetts Master Plan [1990], 
page 5), other sources (such as Denison and Ruston [1990], page 120, and LeBlanc [1988], page 15) assume 
efficiency factors of 85 percent. The latter source's estimate of efficiency factors is based on discussions with 
plant operators at five Massachusetts solid waste cofihcstion facilities. In any case, we will assume an efficiency 
factor that is the average between the high and low estimates, or 90 percent. 
22This is a generous assumption. Incineration of chlorinated substances produces hydrochloric acid, 
which creates serious corrosion problems for the incinerators themselves (Wirka [1988], page 47). In addition, 
the process of incineration puts a severe strain on incinerator machinery. For these reasons, the actual lifetime 
of an incinerator may be only a fraction of what its designers predict (LeBlanc [1988], pages 35-36). 
=As indicated in Column (d) of Table 2, of the $1,065.8 million in capital costs for the nine 
Massachusetts incinerators, $624.7 million (or approximately 59 percent of the capital costs) was financed 
through state-arranged tax-exempt bonds. Assuming that tax-free status lowers the cost of borrowing by 
approximately one-third, the implied (nominal) interest rate for these bonds should be approximately 7 percent 
rather than 10 percent. However, tax-exempt bonds subsidize the capital costs of incinerators. The foregone 
taxes represent a type of social cost not captured in market prices. Therefore, the true social cost of borrowing 
(ignoring, here, the rate of inflation) is actually the market interest rate, estimated at 10 percent, rather than the 
rate for tax-exempt investments. 
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ton for that facility. Four of the other Massachusetts solid waste combustion facilities-- 
North Andover, Pittsfield, Fall River, and Lawrence--will also require similar remedial 
pollution control equipment (Commonwealth Master Plan [ 19901, page 46).*4 Assuming 
that the remedial costs per ton at these four facilities are similar to those at the Saugus 
plant, the total remedial costs for the five facilities will be $375,637,000. Dividing by the 
lifetime capacity of the nine incinerators, which is 63,807,840 tons of solid waste, yields an 
additional investment cost of approximately $6/ton. Again assuming a real interest rate of 
6 percent, the associated interest charges are $5/ton. Thus, the total cost, including 
interest charges, for remedial installation of pollution control equipment is $1 l/ton for the 
Massachusetts incinerators.3 
Another cost of incineration is operating and maintenance expenses. These costs 
have been estimated to be between $18 and $30 per ton (Kovacs [1988], page 541). We 
shall use the rid-point estimate of $24/ton. 
(5 )  Revenues from the Sale of Electricity 
The costs of solid waste incineration are partially offset by revenues from the 
electricity generated during the process. Estimates of the net electricity produced by solid 
waste combustion facilities range from 466 to 606 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per ton of solid 
waste incinerated.% We shall use the mid-point estimate of 536 k W h  per ton. The price 
L*he Saugus facility has a daily capacity of 1500 tons of solid waste. The North Andover, Pittsfield, 
ZNote that the additional cost per ton borne by operators of solid waste combustion facilities 
requiring remedial pollution control equipment is substantially larger (even if financing costs are subsidized by 
tax-free bonds) for two reasons. First, the costs per ton are not averaged over the capacity of incinerators not 
requiring these investments. Second, the investment costs can be spread only over the remaining lifetime 
capacity of the facility in question. It is presumably for these reasons that the incineration fee at the Saugus 
facility has risen by $%/ton in response to the required installation of pollution control equipment (Armerding 
Note also that our estimates of these incinerator costs are not really affected by the remedial nature of 
the investment. However, the fact that Massachusetts incinerators may operate for years with inadequate 
pollution control equipment does contribute to the social costs of environmental harm and disamenities. 
Fall River, and Lawrence facilities have a combined daily capacity of 2902 tons of solid waste. 
P9901). 
%See Denison and Ruston (1990), page 143, and Getz (1990), page 26. In addition, in a telephone 
conversation on October 24, 1990, Jim Richie, representative of Refuse Fuels Associates, reported that RFA 
solid waste combustion facilities (which include the one in Lawrence, Massachusetts) produce from just under 
500 k w h  to 550 k w h  per ton of solid waste incinerated. 
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per kWh is usually set by state regulatory agencies to reflect what the electric utility would 
otherwise have to spend to generate the electricity itself. These avoided costs vary from 
utility to utility and by time of day, season, and year. We shall assume that the solid waste 
combustion facilities receive $.04 per kWh (Denison and Ruston [1990], pages 119-123). 
All of the Massachusetts solid waste combustion facilities produce electricity with 
the exception of the Fall River 'incinerator, which represents approximately 2.5 percent of 
the Massachusetts solid waste incinerator capacity.27 Thus, the total revenue from 
electricity sales equals the product of .975 (the fraction of Massachusetts solid waste 
/ incinerated which generates electricity), 536 kWh (the electricity generated per ton of solid 
waste), and $.@I per kWh (the price of electricity)--for a total of approiimately $21 per ton 
of solid waste incinerated. 
(6)  Incinerator Ash DisDosal 
Additional incineration costs are incurred for the transport and d kposal (by landfill) 
of the ash residue of solid waste combustion. Incinerators are estimated to reduce solid 
waste by 75 percent, leaving 25 percent ash residue by weight.= Baszd on estimates of 
landfilling costs of $159/ton?g developed in the following section, arid on estimates of 
transport costs of $18/ton, every ton of incinerated solid waste prcduces 1/4 ton of 
incinerator ash to be landfilled, at a cost of $44.30 
L'Of the 9712 tons/day of municipal solid waste incineration in Massachusetts, the Fall River facility 
BModern incinerators can reduce the volume of the solid waste they burn by 70 to 90 percent. 
However, unlike unburned waste, incinerator ash does not compact when landfilled. For this reason, the 
Massachusetts Division of Solid Waste uses weight, rather than volume, when computing landfill capacity for 
both ash and solid waste (LeBlanc [1988], page 31). Incinerators typically reduce the weight of solid waste by 
only 65 to 75 percent, leaving 25 percent to 35 percent ash residue by weight (Denison and Ruston [1990], page 
63). We assume a 25 percent ash residue, which is achievable by the best U.S. incinerators. 
291n order to avoid double counting, this estimate of landfilling costs is net of the $50 cost per ton of 
%his estimate assumes that ash can be safely disposed in a solid waste landfii. If incinerator ash 
were classified as hazardous waste (and over 90 percent of fly ash samples recently analyzed by EPA qualified 
as hazardous waste using EPA's toxicity criteria), the direct expenditures for its disposal would grow to 
$250/ton (LeBlanc [1988],pages 32-35), and the total social cost of its transport and disposal would almost 
double from $177/ton to $%3/ton. In that case, the 1/4 ton of incinerator ash for every ton of incinerated solid 
waste would cost %/ton rather than W/ton. 
accounts for 240 tons/day. 
collecting discarded materials for waste disposal. 
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(7) Environmental Harm and Disamenities 
Finally, solid waste combustion facilities impose social costs in the form of 
environmental harm and disamenities. Incinerators emit dioxins, furans, toxic heavy 
metals, acid gases, and numerous toxic an carcinogenic organic compounds. Packaging 
materials contribute to the hazardous pollutants found in air emissions and ash from 
incinerators. Toxic metals, such as lead, cadmium, and chromium, are contained in a 
variety of additives used to make plastics. h a d  and cadmium pigments in colored printing 
inks, frequently used in packaging, are a major source of these metals in combustible 
municipal solid waste. Since metals do not combust, they are present in both air emissions 
and ash residues. Chlorinated plastics, including PVC, also contribute to the chlorine 
present in municipal solid waste. The burning of chlorinated substances produces 
hydrochloric acid and dioxins. Hydrochloric acid is a corrosive that contributes to acid rain 
and combines with moisture to cause localiszed damage to vegetation, paint finishes, and 
ferrous metals. Dioxins are highly toxic chlorinated organic compounds; exposure to even 
minute amounts can cause birth defects, damage to the immune system, skin disorders, 
liver damage, cancer, or death (Commonwealth of Massachusetts [ 19851, pages 43-56). 
Dioxins have been detected in every incinerator surveyed by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and in incinerator ash (Wirka [ 19881, page 47). 
Even if incinerators were equipped with state-of-the-art pollution control equipment 
and were operated at peak efficiency, they would still represent an environmental and 
human hazard and the largest source of air pollution in most communities.31 However, 
many Massachusetts solid waste combustion facilities fall far short of this theoretical ideal, 
operating with inadequate air pollution control equipment and subject to ineffective 
monitoring (partially because testing of incinerator stack emissions is very expensive and 
partially because of limited engineering and scientific knowledge about the "safe" design 
and operation of incinerators).3* Furthermore, the storage and transportation of 
incinerator ash is inadequately regulated, exposing those in the vicinity of the facility to the 
hazards posed by the airborne ash (LeBlanc [1988], page 33)?3 Finally, solid waste 
SIFurthermore, the better the control of incinerator air pollution, the more toxic the incinerator ash 
32See LeBlanc [1988], pages 23-31. 
33Furthermore, methods to prevent ash from becoming airborne create environmental hazards of their 
own. For example, watering the ash makes the liquid runoff a hazard. Even if controlled at the incinerator site, 
runoff from the wet ash is liable to leak from trucks during transport to the landfill. 
which must be disposed of. 
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combustion facilities are unattractive and produce unsightly and malodorous smoke 
emissions. 
It is difficult to place a monetary value on the environmental hazards and 
disamenities associated with incineration. At a conceptual level, these social costs can be 
represented by the monetary payment to members of the community required to induce 
them to accept a solid waste combustion facility. .The following thought-experiment would, 
in principle, elicit the desired willingness-to-accept sum: (1) each candidate community 
submits a sealed bid containing its willingness-to-accept value, which it will receive if it is 
the "winner"; (2) the winner of the sealed-bid auction is the low bid; and (3) the losing 
communities must pay the winning community its willingness-to-accept monetary sum, 
where each losing community's share is proportional to the relative size of its willing-to- 
accept bid. Several sealed-bid mechanisms of this type have been designed and analyzed in 
controlled laboratory experiments for hypothetical payoffs.3 However, we have no 
empirical evidence of a community's willingness-to-accept value for an incinerator, since no 
sealed-bid auction for an incinerator siting has ever been conducted.35 
Another method for placing, a monetary value on environmental harm and 
disamenities is to impute the value from observed market transactions. For example, the 
proximity of a house to a solid waste combustion facility can be expected to expose its 
occupants to environmental hazards and disamenities, the magnitude of which might be 
reflected in the market price of the house. Although each house consists of a 
heterogeneous mix of characteristics which influence its value, a so-called "hedonic" model 
allows one to develop price functions for any individual characteristic.% According to the 
simultaneously measures the buyer's marginal willingness to pay for that attribute and the 
seller's or supplier's marginal offer price. The hedonic approach has been used to derive a 
market value for environmental factors such as air pollution and noise levels.37 However, 
as a practical matter, this approach is subject to several modeling and estimation problems, 
particularly imperfect information on the part of buyers and sellers (e.g., they may not be 
aware of the actual environmental hazards) and non-linear or interactive relationships 
%ee, for example, Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986), Kunreuther et al. (1987), Kunreuther and 
Easterling (1990), and Kunreuther et al. (1990). 
35Furthermore, it is not obvious how, in practice, a community determines or aggregates the 
%See, for example, Rosen (1974). 
37Previous applications of the hedonics approach are discussed in Brookshire et al. (1982). 
hedonic rlobel, +ha L11G JIUyG 01n-a of :he price gradient %'ith respect afiy characterktic 
willingness-to-accept values of its citizens. 
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among the variables (e.g., an undesirable location is likely to affect both the type of 
homebuyer attracted and homeowner decisions that influence the market value of the 
house). 
A third approach, the one employed here, is to use survey questions to derive 
homeowners' willingness to pay to avoid environmental hazards and disa nenities.38 Smith 
and Desvousges (1986) asked respondents from a sample of households in suburban 
Massachusetts to choose between two homes that were identical except for two attributes: 
the distance from a landfill containing hazardous wastes and the price ot' the house. The 
survey responses were used to estimate a demand function for distance from the hazardous 
waste facility, where this attribute reflects the associated environmental risk and 
disamenities. The econometric results, for which the coefficients for the marginal price (as 
a function of distance) and the housing price are statistically significant, imply that the 
average household would realize a consumer surplus of between $330 and $495 annually 
for each additional mile between its residence and the waste facility. 
These results form the basis for our estimation of the social cost of incinerator- 
related environmental harm and disamenities. Although all incinerator waste is not 
hazardous, incinerators may be viewed as "quasi-hazardous" waste facilities because of the 
environmental risks indicated earlier. Accordingly, we shall assume that the value of the 
environmental harm and disamenities for an incinerator are half the value of those for a 
hazardous waste landfill. Taking half of the mid-point of the Smith-Desvousges estimates, 
which is $412, we obtain a value of $206 per year per additional mile of distance from an 
incinerator. The median distance from the hazardous waste landfill 'before respondents in 
the Smith-Desvousges would accept it is approximately 10 miles. We shall use this median 
point as our threshold distance.39 Each household will therefore receive a consumer 
surplus of $206 annually per mile to increase its current distance from an incinerator to 10 
miles. Once beyond the 10-mile threshold, additional distance from the incinerator 
provides no additional consumer surplus. 
.WDespite the fact that these survey responses cannot be considered as reliable as actual market 
responses, survey criteria developed in Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze (1986) suggest the consistency and 
absence of strategic bias of the survey results that follow. Summaries of other applications of this survey 
approach to value public goods are provided in Brookshire et al. (1982) and Cummings, Brookshire, and 
Schulze (1986). 
39Because incinerators disperse pollutants through the air, the environmental hazard extends over a 
much wider geographical range than in the case of a landfill. For this reason, we maintained the threshold 
distances derived for the hazardous waste landfill, even though the incinerator is only quasi-hazardous. 
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The average town or city in Massachusetts has a population of 17,000, which is 
equivalent to approximately 6,000 households.40 On average, there is the equivalent of 
approximately 13 cities and towns within a 10-mile radius of any point in Massach~setts.~~ 
Therefore, 80,000 households, on average, will be located within that lO-mile radius. For 
these 80,000 households, their average distance from the facility will be approximately 7 
miles.42 The average household would derive benefits of $206 per mile annually were it 3 
miles (the lO-mile threshold minus the average distance of 7 miles) further away from the 
facility. Therefore, the 80,000 households would each realize a benefit of $618 annually if 
they could avoid the environmental hazard and disamenities of incineration, for a total of 
$49.4 million per incinerator annually. Since the average solid waste combustion facility in 
Massachusetts incinerates approximately 354,488 tons of solid waste ann~ally,~3 we 
estimate that the average environmental hazard and disamenities cost per ton of solid 
waste incinerated is approximately $139.44 
7 
WMassachusetts had 351 cities and towns and a population of 5,971,000 in 1989 (Massachusetts Master 
Plan [1989], pages 36, 43,49, and 60), an average of 17,011 persons per city or town. Based on an average in 
Massachusetts of 2.78 persons per household (US. Department of Commerce [1980], page 49 ,  the average 
number of households per city or town is 5,948. 
41The area of Massachusetts is 8257 square miles. On average, each of the 351 Massachusetts cities 
and towns contains approximately 23.5 square miles. A circle with a 10-mile radius encompasses approximately 
314 square miles, which equals the area of 13.4 cities and towns. Note that a strategy of siting incinerators only 
in the least populated areas in Massachusetts is undermined by the high cost per mile of transporting solid 
waste from the population centers to the facility. 
42The average distance of 7 miles assumes that the households are uniformly distributed within the 
circle circumscribing the 10-mile radius. (The area of a circle with a 7-mile radius is 49 II, almost exactly half 
the area of a circle with a 10-mile radius.) 
43Earlier we calculated that the annual capacity for the nine incinerators was 3,190,392 tons, or an 
average of 354,488 tons per incinerator. 
44From Tables A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix, it is clear that the avoided cost of environmental hazards 
and disamenities, particularly those associated with incineration, is the category of social benefits most sensitive 
to different (but plausible) assumptions. Ideally, therefore, it would be preferable to have an independent, 
reliable benchmark of the range of legitimate values for avoided environmental hazards and disamenities-so as 
to be able to verify that our estimate of $139/ton is reasonable. Unfortunately, the inability of the market to 
reflect the risks of environmental harm and disamenities makes it difficult to develop such a benchmark. 
Nevertheless, three facts suggest that households do place a significant value on avoiding the environmental 
hazards and disamenities caused by solid waste incinerators. First, in a political context, is the fact that citizens 
invest considerable time and expense to challenge the siting of these hazardous facilities in their community. 
Second, the health consequences of the environmental hazards impose huge real market costs, in the form of 
medical treatment, lost productivity, and related costs of environmentally-related disease. (Furthermore, the 
property damage caused by an incinerator's chemical releases also imposes real market costs.) Third, of the 
possible environmental hazards, the public's opposition is largest when the risk is unnecessary (e.g., less 
hazardous technical solutions, such as recycling, are available) and when the safety of the facility cannot be 
assured because of inherent risks in the technology or because of the inability of regulators to monitor the 
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The social cost per ton of solid waste incinerated is summarized in Table 3 for the 
seven cost elements we considered plus the cost of collecting discarded materials for 
incineration. Every ton of solid waste incineration that recycling avoids provides a social 
benefit of $289. Since we have assumed that 70 percent of every ton of packaging material 
not recycled is incinerated, the avoided incineration cost is $202 per ton of recycled 
packaging material. 
E. The Avoided Disposal Costs of Landfilling 
The final social benefit of recycling is the avoided costs of landfilling 30 percent of 
the unrecycled packaging material solid waste. In addition to the costs of collecting 
discarded materials for landfilling, the total social costs of landfilling consist of five 
separate elements: (1) capital costs; (2) operating costs; (3) clean-up and post-closure 
care costs; (4) the costs imposed by stricter landfill regulations; and ( 5 )  the social cost of 
environmental harm and disamenities. 
The capital costs, including interest, for a 55-acre landfill accepting 240 tons of 
waste per day over a 20-year lifetime have been estimated, according to a landfill model, to 
be approximately $25/ton; the cost of monitoring and operating such a landfill have been 
estimated to be approximately $35/ton (between $30 and $40 a t0n).~5 Even after the 
landfill is closed, costs will be incurred to maintain the landfill's environmental monitoring 
systems and the leachate collection system. These post-closure costs are equal to 
approximately 15 percent of capital and operating costs (Glebs [1988]). In addition, the 
leaching of landfill wastes may impose significant clean-up costs. To estimate these costs, 
we use reported projections of "unanticipated costs," which are equal to approximately 10 
percent of capital and operating costs (Glebs [ 1988]).46 However, these post-closure and 
clean-up costs generally are incurred at the end of a landfill's useful life. Discounting these 
costs, again using a real rate of interest of 6 percent, reduces their magnitude from 25 
percent to 13 percent of capital and operating costs, or approximately $8/ton. 
operator's performance (Kunreuther and Easterling [1990] and Kunreuther el al. [1s)90]). 
conditions characterize solid waste incineration. 
These precise 
45See Tufts University (1988), pages 12-13. 
*his may be a serious underestimate. The Commonwealth reports that of its 194 active landfills, 
only 28 are built with liners, and that over 40 percent of its active landfills threaten to pollute, or are polluting, 
surface and ground waters (Massachusetts Solid Waste Master Plan [1989], page 10). On the other hand, the 
additional clean-up costs required for these high-risk landfills may be offset, more or less, by their low (relative 
to our estimates) original construction costs. 
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TABLE 3 
THE AVOIDEO DISPOSAL COSTS OF INCINERATION 
COST ELEMENT COST/TON 
Solid Waste Collect*~on Costs for Incineration $ 50 
Capital Costs $ 32 
Federal Tax Subsidy $ 10 
Operating Costs $ 24 
Revenues from the Sale of Electricity ($ 21) 
Cost of Incinerator Ash Disposal $ 44 
Cost of Envi ronmental Hazards and Di sameni ti es $139 
Cost of Remedial Pollution Control Equipment $ 11 
TOTAL $289 
The preceding landfill costs, totaling $68/ton, are for the construction of a landfill in 
1988. However, stricter Federal and state regulations regarding landfill siting, basic design, 
closure, and long-term care, are estimated to increase landfill costs by approximately 23 
the cost of stricter regulation is thus equal to $16/ton, increasing total landfill 
costs to $84/ton.'@ 
Finally, solid waste landfills also impose social costs in the form of environmental 
harm and disamenities. An indication of the magnitude of the environmental risk is the 
fact that 20 percent of the sites on the National Priorities List (those sites designated by the 
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, under the auspices of the Superfund program, as 
most in need of clean-up) are municipal solid waste landfills (Office of Technology 
Assessment [1989], page 42). Part of the environmental hazard posed by landfills is due to 
the presence of incinerator ash.49 However, part of the hazard is due to directly-land filled 
solid waste that pollutes, or threatens to pollute, the state's water resources. Packaging 
wastes contribute to the leaching problem. For example, plasticizers, which are used to 
makc hard and brittle plastic resins flexible, are prone to leaching because they are used in 
high concentrations and tend to have a low compatibility with resins (Wirka [ 19881). 
In order to derive a monetary value for the environmental risks and disamenities 
posed by landfills, we will use the same methodology previously employed to estimate the 
social cost of solid waste incineration. We take as our starting point the earlier estimate of 
$206 as a household's consumer surplus per year for every additional mile of distance from 
an incinerator (which, in turn, was derived from the Smith-Desvousges estimate of 
consumer surplus realized by additional distance from a hazardous waste facility). 
Although the same packaging materials are involved, incineration poses a larger 
environmental hazard than landfilling because the process of incineration creates dioxins, 
hydrochloric acid, and other harmful organic compounds. For this reason, we will assume 
that the consumer surplus obtained for an additional mile of distance from a solid waste 
landfill is only $103, half the value per additional mile of distance from a solid waste 
. 
4'Thi~ percentage is derived from data presented in Glebs (1988). The true costs of stricter regulation 
are likely to be larger for Massachusetts landfills, according to James Ducett, Environmental Analyst, 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, during a telephone conversation on October 9, 1990. 
'%'he fact that many tipping fees for landfilling solid waste exceed $100 per ton, and are rising rapidly, 
provides some, albeit qualified, evidence that these estimates of landfill costs are not exaggerated. See Tufts 
University (1988), page 11. 
491ncinerator ash is so hazardous that 94 percent of the fly ash samples analyzed exceeded limits for 
lead or cadmium or both under EPAs standard for defining hazardous waste. See Denison and Ruston (lW), 
page 183. 
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incinerator. Also, because the degree of hazard is lower and because the pollutants are 
generally not dispersed through the air, we reduce the threshold distance from the disposal 
facility from 10 miles for an incinerator to 4 miles for a solid waste landfill (sufficient to 
encompass the city or town containing the landfill and the bordering land in neighboring 
communities). On average, there is the equivalent of 2.14 fir11 cities and towns within a 4- 
mile radius of any point in Massachusetts.~o 
Since the average Massachusetts city or town contain!; 6000 households, 2.14 cities 
and towns will contain approximately 12,840 households. For these households, their 
average distance from the landfill will be approximately 2.83 miles.51 The average 
household within the 4-mile radius will derive benefits of $103 per mile annually up to a 
distance of 4 miles from the landfill. Since the average household is 2.83 miles from the 
landfill, the average number of miles over which households realize consumer surplus is 
1.17 miles (that is, 4 miles minus 2.83 miles). Total annual emironmental and disamenities 
costs per landfill are 12,840 households multiplied by 1.17 m les and $103 per mile, for a 
total of approximately $1,550,000 annually. Since tne average landfill in Massachusetts 
disposes of 21,000 tons of solid waste annually?2 the environrriental harm and disamenities 
cost per ton of landfilled solid waste is approximately $75. 
In Table 4, we combine this cost with the previous costs of landfilling and the cost of 
collecting discarded materials for landfilling to obtain a total cost of $209/ton. Thus, every 
ton of solid waste that is recycled rather than landfilled provides a social benefit of $209. 
Since we have assumed that 30 percent of every ton of packaging materialnot recycled is 
landfilled, the avoided landfilling cost is $63 per ton of recycled packaging material. 
>"On average, each city and town in Massachusetts has an area of approximately 23.5 square miles. A 
circle with a Cmile radius encompasses approximately 50 square miles, which is equal to 2.14 Massachusetts 
cities or towns. 
51A circle with a radius of 4 miles has an area of 16 II square miles. A circle with a radius of 
approximately 2.83 miles would have an area of approximately 8ll  square miles-half the area of the circle with 
the Cmile radius. Therefore, assuming that households are uniformly distributed within 4 miles of the landfill, 
the average distance from the landfill is 2.83 miles. 
521n 1988, Massachusetts had 194 active landfills. Of the 6.6 million tons of municipal solid waste that 
year, 63 percent, or 4.15 million tons, was landfilled. Hence, on average, each of the active Massachusetts 
landfills disposed of approximately 21,000 tons in 1988. (Source: Commonwealth of Massachusetts Master 
Plan, [1989], pages 11-l3.) 
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TABLE 4 
THE AVOlDED DISPOSAL COSTS OF L A N D F I L L I N G  
COST E LEMENT COST/ TON 
S o l i d  Waste Collection Costs for Landfilling $ 50 
Capital Costs $ 25 
Operating Costs $ 35 
Clean-up and Post-Closure Care Costs $ 8  
Costs o f  Stricter Federal Regul ati on 8 16 
Cost o f  Environmental Hazards and Disamenities $ 75 
TOTAL $209 
.F. Conclusion 
Based on the preceding estimates, we are now able to calculate the net social 
benefit of recycling, as applied to packaging material. Recycling by itself provides revenues 
of $49/ton and costs $86/ton, for a net loss of $37/ton. However, every ton of packaging 
material that is recycled avoids the payment of subsidies to virgin materials, the disposal 
costs of incineration, and the disposal costs of landfilling. The avoided subsidy to virgin 
materials was previously estimated to be $3/ton. The social cost of incineration we 
estimated to be $289 per ton incinerated. Since only 70 percent of packaging material 
waste is incinerated, the avoided incinerator cost from recycling packaging material is 70 
percent of $289/ton, which equals $202/ton. The social cost of landfilling was estimated to 
be $209 per ton landfilled. Since only 30 percent of packaging material waste is landfilled, 
the avoided landfilling cost from recycling packaging material is 30 percent of $209/ton, 
which equals $63/ton. Thus, as summarized in Table 5, the net social benefit of recycling 
packaging material is $23l/ton. 
We are mindful of the argument posed that the public sometimes overestimates the 
environmental consequences of both incineration and landfilling. Such overestimation, if it 
exists, could be reflected in our willingness-to-pay measure of environmental harm and 
disamenities, with the effect of inflating those estimates. However, even if environmental 
harm and disamenities were zero, the net social benefit of recycling would still be $97/ton. 
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TABLE 5 
THE NET SOCIAL BENEFITS OF RECYCLING 
SOURCE OF THE BENEFIT 
Recycl i ng Revenues 
Recycl i ng Costs 
Recycl i ng Net Revenue 
$/TON 
$-37 
Avoided Subsidy t o  V i  r g i  n Mater i  a1 s $ 3  
Avoided Cost/Ton I n c i n e r a t e d  
Share o f  Discards I n c i n e r a t e d  
Avoided Cost o f  I n c i n e r a t i o n  
Avoi ded Cost/Ton Landf i 1 1 ed 
Share o f  Discards Landf i  11 ed 
Avoided Cost o f  L a n d f i l l i n g  
TOTAL 
$289 / t cm 
X A  
$202 
$209/ ton  
x , 3 p  
m 
$23 1 
PARTTWO: 
WHY RECYCLING STANDARDS FOR PACKAGING ARE NECESSARY 
In Part One of this study, we estimated that the net social benefit of recycling is 
approximately $231 per ton of packaging material that is recycled rather than incinerated 
or landfilled. An obvious pair of questions immediately arise: (1) If the benefits of 
recycling are so substantial, then won't private markets provide the desired expansion of 
recycling activity (to its optimal level)? (2) Relatedly, if the unfettered marketplace 
promotes recycling, then why are recycling standards for packaging (RSP)--or any other 
form of government intervention, for that matter--needed? In the analysis that follows, we 
address these questions. 
We begin by examining the market imperfections that plague recycling efforts. The 
predominant response of government to remedy the situation--to increase the separation 
and collection of recyclable materials-is examined and its fatal limitations noted. In 
addition, alternative policy instruments--in particular, economic charges, procurement 
preferences, and unconditional bans-are evaluated and found wanting. Finally, we 
introduce the concept of recycling standards for packaging and explain the operation of an 
RSP program both as a means of addressing the area in which recycling has been most 
vulnerable--the demand for recovered materials-and, in a larger context, as the 
centerpiece of government involvement needed to stimulate recycling. 
A. Imperfections in Solid Waste Disposal Markets 
For a market to operate efficiently, economic agents must bear the full marginal 
social costs (and realize the full marginal social benefits) associated with their actions.53 In 
the context of recycling, this condition requires that economic agents incur the marginal 
social costs of disposing of the solid waste they create. In practice, however, imperfections 
in solid waste disposal markets prevent this condition from being realized. 
The classic example of an externality, environmental pollution, accounts for part of 
the market failure.54 Because the price for solid waste disposal does not reflect the 
environmental harm and disamenities accompanying such activities, solid waste generators 
? 3 e e ,  for example, Baumol and Oates (1975), pages 16-24, or Tietenberg (1988), page 179. 
54Externalities arise when the actions of one economic agent affect the utility or production function of 
another economic agent in the absence of any related economic transactions between the two parties. See 
Baumol and Oates (1975), pages 16-18; Spulber (1989), pages 46-48; and Varian (1978), pages 202-203. 
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are able to escape these costs.55 The other source of the market failure arises from the way 
in which solid waste collection and disposal are financed. In the usual case, local 
government assumes responsibility for solid waste collection and disposal and incurs 
market costs in the provision of those services.56 Local government typically finances these 
market costs from general tax revenues. Each household incurs, through taxation, 
approximately the market costs of material discards for the average household in the 
community. In other words, the size of a household's tax payment is not directly related to 
the amount of material it discards. Thus, a household's marginal tax burden of discarding 
an additional unit of trash is effectively zero, even though the associated market cost is 
To see this, consider the following simplified example. Suppose a town contains 
6000 households and that each household pays $400 a year in taxes for the collection and 
disposal of the 6000 pounds of solid waste that it generates.58 Assume further that total 
solid waste costs incurred in the market increase linearly with the amount of solid waste, so 
that the marginal cost to the town of each additional pound of trash collected and disposed 
is 6.7 cents. However, the cost borne by the household, in tax payments, for each 
additional pound of trash it discards is only 6.7/6000 cents, or .0011 cents, since the 
marginal cost is distributed equally over all the households through taxes. Thus, the 
household's internalized marginal cost is virtually zero (approximately 1/ 1000 of a penny 
per additional pound of trash it discards), although the town's marginal cost is 6.7 cents per 
pound. This discrepancy between the marginal cost borne by those who discard an 
additional unit of trash and the actual marginal cost of waste collection and disposal 
not? 
33Based on the calculations in Part One, the social cost of environmental hazards and disamenities is 
approximately $134 per ton of solid waste disposed. (The social cost of environmental hazards and disamenities 
is approximately $160 per ton of solid waste that is incinerated--including $21 of the $44 for the landfilling of 
incinerator ash-and $75 per ton of solid waste that is landfilled. It is predicted that 70 percent of solid waste in 
Massachusetts will be incinerated and 30 percent landfilled.) 
%Based on the estimates developed in Part One, the government's out-of-pocket expenses for solid 
waste collection and disposal are, on average, approximately $130 per ton ($129 per ton in the case of 
incineration and $W per ton in the case of landfilling). 
57For further discussion on this point, see, for example, Page (1977), pages 89-91, or Tietenberg 
%hese are close approximations of the actual number of households in the average Massachusetts 
City or town, the number of tons generated per Massachusetts household (2.78 persons per household 
multiplied by 1.1 tons per person, assuming the commercial share of municipal solid waste is apportioned to 
households), and the government's annual cost per household for solid waste collection and disposal in 
Massachusetts ($130 per ton, in out-of-pocket costs, for collection and disposal, multiplied by 1.1 tons per 
person and 2.78 persons per household). 
. 
(1988), page 179. 
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distorts the incentives of individuals to reduce the amount of material they discard and 
creates significant market inefficiencies.59 
As demonstrated in simplified form in Figure 1, the presence of imperfections in 
solid waste disposal markets results in an inadequate amount of recycling from a social 
perspective. Ewnornic agents, confronted with the alternatives of solid waste disposal or 
recycling, will select the option which is cheapest to them. Recycling activity will continue 
until the marginal cost of an additional unit of recycling (MCR) exceeds the marginal 
private cost of disposing of that unit of solid waste (MCp)--until Point Qp in Figure 1. 
However, it would be socially preferable to increase the level of recycling to Point Qs in 
Figure 1, where the marginal cost of recycling (MCR) is equal to the marginal social cost of 
solid waste disposal (MCS). 
The range of economic activities which are affected by imperfections in solid waste 
disposal markets is illustrated in Figure 2, which tracks the flow of virgin and recycled 
materials. The market for recycled materials itself is affected by all of the economic 
activities in Figure 2. Some of the market relationships are obvious. For example, the 
supply of recycled materials is influenced by how the discarded materials of the various 
economic agents are separated and collected;@ and the demand for recycled materials in 
packaging is ultimately derived from final demand for packaged products--which is then 
incorporated in product manufacturers' demand for packaging and packagers' demand for 
packaging materials. Other relationships are more subtle and complex. For example, 
virgin materials developers and processors are able to affect the supply of recycled 
materials by the way in which they design virgin materials (say, by adding antibxidants in 
resin formulation to overcome polymer deterioration during - recycling, in the case of 
plastics). Similarly, packagers can design packaging to promote recycling (such as by using 
homogeneous materials that eliminate the difficulty and cost of separating the packaging, 
once discarded, xcordhg to its component materials). The important point to note here is 
3yAnother example, in a more familiar context, might help clariQ this conclusion. Suppose 20 
fraternity brothers go out for dinner at an expensive restaurant and agree beforehand to split the bill evenly 
among themselves. In that case, the cost to the individual of anything he orders is only 1/20th of the cost to the 
group. In general, this pricing arrangement induces the participants to make uneconomic decisions (peer 
pressure notwithstanding). Thus, for example, each individual might now order a $10 shrimp cocktail, which he 
would not have done under normal circumstances, since his order adds only $50 to his share of the bill. The 
effects on the financing of solid waste costs are analogous, except that the number of participants diluting each 
individual's marginal cost is 6OOO (in the earlier example) rather than 20. For an analysis of the general form of 
this problem (which, note, encompasses environmental pollution), see Olson (1974), pages 22-36. 
60Note that, as indicated in Figure 2, the separation of discarded materials can occur both before and 
after the materials are collected. 
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FIGURE 1: THE HARKET FOR 8ECYCLING 
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that the recycling incentives of all of the economic agents are adversely affected by the 
pricing distortions in solid waste disposal markets. 
B. Government-Mandated Separation and Collection of Recyclable Materials 
In order to enhalice the impaired recycling activity taking place in private markets 
(and to help solve the solid waste crisis currently confronting them), state and local 
governments throughout the United States have established or expanded programs to 
separate and collect recyclable materials. In a sense, such programs parallel the popular 
conception of what recycling is: the removal of "reusable" materials from the solid waste 
stream. But until the recovered materials are actually reused--until they are converted into 
new products and sold to new customers-no meaningful recycling has been achieved. It is 
the inability of government-mandated waste separation and collection programs to remedy 
deficiencies in demand for the recovered materials that will quickly cause them to fail. 
To see this, consider Figure 3, which represents the market for recycled materials. 
Prior to government intervention, the intersection of the demand curve for recovered 
materials (D) and the supply curve for recovered materials (so) results in an equilibrium 
amount of recycling of Qo and an equilibrium price for recovered material of Po. If an 
isolated community or state mandated that its recyclable solid waste be separated and 
collected, such a program could succeed. The supply curve for recovered materials would 
shift to S1, increasing the equilibrium amount of recycling to Q1 and reducing the 
equilibrium price for recovered material to PI. However, with numerous states and 
co~iiurii ies imuitaneousiy separating and coiiecting recyciabie soiid waste, the suppiy 
curve for recovered materials would shift to S2. The price for recovered material could not 
fall below P2--a negative amount, equal to the cost of solid waste disposal--because below 
P2, it would be cheaper to landfill or incinerate the recyclable material than to pay 
recyclers to take it. At a price of P2 for recovered material, the maximum possible amount 
of recycling (given demand curve D) is Q-. The residual quantity of separated and 
collected material, Q2 - Q-, would have to be disposed of as solid waste. 
Could such a dire outcome actually occur in practice? It already has. The president 
of a leading wastepaper recycling corporation recently stated, "Cities have ... discovered that 
no markets exist for their collected [recyclables]. The ultimate indignity is sending those 
collected materials to the landfill. And believe me, that has happened over and over 
again."61 
OlThe statement was made by Don DeMeuse, president of Fort Howard Corporation, at the 9th 
National Recycling Congress (as reported in Breen [1990], pages 44-45). 
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FIGURE 3: THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT-MANDATED SEPARATION 
AND COLLECTION OF RECYCLABLE MATERIALS 
The problem is that the amount of recycling currently taking place is relatively small 
in comparison to the quantity of recovered material that state waste separation and 
collection programs could unload on the market. For example, one study estimated that if 
Massachusetts and New Jersey enacted mandatory wastepaper separation and collection 
laws, the two states alone could produce a quarter cf all the U.S. wastepaper consumed 
nationally and by export, and for the regional market consisting of the nine New England 
and mid-Atlantic states, over 100 percent of all mixed wastepaper, 46 percent of all 
corrugated paper, and 42 percent of used newspapers (;;hen being used by the region).62 As 
additional states institute programs to separate and collect recyclable materials, the price 
for recovered material will plummet, and eventually the market for recovered material will 
become saturated and collapse, when brokers require more money to haul off the material 
than sellers are willing to pay (below P2 in Figure 3).63 
The only way to avoid this outcome--while at the same time dramatically increasing 
recycling to levels warranted by its net social benefits4 to cause a dramatic shift in the 
demand for recovered materials. (Figure 4 illustrates the effect of a positive--rightward-- 
shift in demand from D to D2, which allows the market for recovered materials to 
accommodate the shift in supply to S2 resulting from multistate government-mandated 
separation and collection of recyclable materials.) Any government program to promote 
recycling must therefore focus on stimulating the demand for recycled materials as its first 
order of business. 
C. Available Demand-Side Policieq 
Many state and local governments have, in fact, proposed--and, in some cases, 
implemented-measures to increase the demand for recycled materials. Prominent among 
these measures are economic charges and tmes, government procurement policies, and 
unconditional bans. After briefly reviewing their relative merits, we consider a fourth 
alternative: recycling standards for packaging. 
%ee Nielson (1986) and also the description of the study in Kovacs (1988), pages 593-594. The level 
of wastepaper separation and collection to be attained by the laws, equal to 20 percent of their respective paper 
waste streams, was fairly modest. 
6%'here is abundant evidence, both domestically and from abroad, of the destabilizing effects of a glut 
of recovered materials. For example, when West Germany's mandatory recycling legislation produced a 
massive oversupply of paper, the result was chaos in the usual paper markets. See Kovacs (1988), pages 565- 
566. 
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(1) Economic Charges and Taxes 
In theory, the ideal method of correcting resource misallocations stemming from a 
divergence between social cost and private cost is to introduce a user charge or tax so as to 
eliminate the divergence. Candidate charges or taxes to remedy inefficiencies in the 
pricing of solid waste disposal--and thereby to make recycling relatively less expensive as an 
alternative to disposal-include household charges for solid waste disposal, taxes on 
materials used to package products to reflect the social cost of their subsequent disposal, 
and taxes on virgin materials.@ However, there are practical problems associated with 
each of these. 
In the case of household charges for solid waste disposal,65 if households are billed 
per (standard-sized) can of garbage, the amount of solid waste a household actually 
generates is very imprecisely measured. If households are charged by the weight of their 
garbage, then the metering costs may become prohibitive. In addition, the disposal costs 
depend to some extent on the composition of the solid waste, further ciiminishing the 
accuracy of household charges for solid waste disposal as a corrective measure. Finally, 
household charges for solid waste disposal may induce illegal dumping and other 
unauthorized disposal of solid waste (although the actual magnitude of this response in the 
United States appears not to have been subject to systematic analysis). Thus, these charges 
can be expected to have a limited and somewhat uncertain effect on consumer demand for 
recyclable products and packaging, or for less wasteful packaging.66 
b41n addition, government subsidies to promote recycling are possible. However, these are generally 
inferior io economic charges or taxes for at ieast two reasons. Fist, recyciing subsidies create their own market 
inefficiencies, since the actual pricing distortion involves solid waste disposal, not recycling per se. Thus, 
recycling subsidies could create the anomaly of rewarding the recycling of a material when reducing the amount 
of material used in the fist place would be socially preferable. Second, subsidies impose costs on government 
while economic charges and taxes are a source of government revenue. Furthermore, economic charges or 
taxes to correct divergences from marginal cost pricing are virtually unique among public finance mechanisms 
in eliminating rather than creating efficiency losses (Nichols [1984], pages 34-35). 
65Note that household solid waste charges refer only to fees directly paid by the household for each 
additional unit of solid waste that it generates. The per-ton tipping fee for use of a solid waste disposal facility 
does not qualify because the charge is directly levied on the local community rather than on the individual 
household. A household’s annual property tax apportionment for solid waste disposal does not qualify because 
its property taxes do not vary according to the amount of solid waste it generates. Therefore, for reasons 
discussed earlier, neither increases in tipping fees nor increases in property taxes to pay for solid waste disposal 
will stimulate consumer demand for recycling. 
a m e r e  household charges for solid waste disposal can have a considerable effect is on incentives to 
separate recyclable materials for collection. For example, in Seattle, where households are charged $13.50 a 
month for a one-can weekly pickup plus $9.00 per additional can, with recyclables hauled away for free, total 
solid waste landfilled declined by 22 percent in the first year and voluntary recycling rose from 22 percent to 36 
percent. See Passell (1991), page C6. 
3 3  
Similar problems exist for taxes on products packaged in non-recyclable materials. 
Basing the tax on the weight of the packaging and the disposal costs of the specific 
materials comprising the packaging for each individual product would create appreciable 
administrative costs, as would collecting the tax at the point-of-sale. Employing a simple 
taxin2 forciula would relieve administrative costs somewhat but would reduce the 
effectiveness of the tax as a corrective measure. In addition, the magnitude of the tax, if set 
equal to the cost of disposing of the packaging, would probably not exceed a few cents per 
packaged product; it is unclear whether such a small sum would have a significant effect on 
consumer d1:mand for products in recyclable packaging. Nevertheless, the tax could have 
informational and symbolic value for those consumers with a preference for recyclable 
packaging, who would probably select the non-taxed product from among otherwise similar 
choices, regardless of the magnitude of the tax, as an expression of their support for 
recycling. 
Taxes on virgin materials can easily be set equal to the cost of their ultimate 
disposal and would be relatively inexpensive to administer.67 The problem with taxes on 
virgin materials is that, to be effective, they must be applied nationally. Therefore, taxes on 
virgin materials are not a viable policy option for individual state governments. 
Furthermore, as a federal policy option, it is questionable whether federal taxes on virgin 
materials of $200 per ton or more-if set equal to the social cost of disposal--would be 
politically feasible at this time. 
In sum, while user charges and taxes can help to stimulate demand for recycled 
materials, because of the practical problems enumerated above, states cannot hope to 
remedy the deficient demand for recycled materiais with these measures alone. 
(2) State Procure ment Policies 
One promising method a state can employ to stimulate demand for recyclable 
materials is to increase its own demand for recyclable materials in the products it buys. For 
example, a state can require, as part of its procurement policy, that a certain percentage of 
6'A more comprehensive and sophisticated version of a tax on virgin materials would be an 
externalities tax or "predisposal" tax on materials, presumably levied at the manufacturing level, which would be 
based on the magnitude of all externalities generated during the life-cycle of the product from extraction of 
virgin materials to ultimate disposal. In this case, the administrative costs (just to calculate the tax) would be 
much more substantial. However, its major defect is the same as for a tax on virgin materials: the state is not 
the appropriate jurisdiction in which to apply it. 
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its purchased products be recyclable or made of recycled material, or it can give price 
preferences to items containing recycled materials. 
Such state procurement programs can obviously help to promote recycling. After 
all, state purchases represent approximately 12 to 13 percent of the U.S. Gross National 
Product.68 On the other hand, for many material applications, such as product packaging, 
the state's purchases constitute a much smaller percentage and, in general, state purchases 
cannot remedy the deficient private demand for recyclable materials. 
(3) Unconditional Package or Material Bans 
Numerous states and local governments have banned or are considering banning 
specific packaging materials and containers thought to be egregious contributors to the 
solid waste disposal problems confronting them. For example, Maine has banned 
"brickpack" containers, and approximately thirty jurisdictions have banned polystyrene 
foam or other plastic packaging.@ Note that these are unconditional bans untied to any 
performance standard; manufacturers of the materials or packaging in question therefore 
cannot take steps, other than political ones, to avoid the ban. 
A major objective of these bans is to promote recycling and thereby to reduce the 
amount of solid waste that must be landfilled or incinerated. As a mechanism to increase 
the demand for recovered materials, however, such unconditional bans are largely 
ineffective. Unconditional bans eliminate the possibility of recycling the banned material 
(or packaging)70 and provide no additional demand for recovery of the material that 
replaces it except to the extent t'nat tine substitute materiais are tinemseives composed of 
recycled materials (and unconditional bans do not stimulate the use of recycled content in 
these applications). Indeed, the material substituted may itself be unrecyclable in that 
application (paper packaging contaminated with food, for instance). Furthermore, 
unconditional bans may actually exacerbate the solid waste problems they are attempting 
to solve.71 For example, the substitute material or packaging could result in more food 
wSee Kovacs (1988), page 576. 
69See Lifset and Chertow (1990) and Kovacs (1988), pages 581-582. 
7hypically, unconditional bans are applied to products whose offending attribute is immutable. For 
example, deadly to& may be banned from use in production because of the inherent health hazard they 
represent. By comparison, the recyclability of a package or material is generally capable of improvement, given 
the proper incentives. 
711n some instances, bans of materials or packaging-particularly plastics--have been motivated by the 
fact that they are not biodegradable (Kovacs 119881, pages 582-583). However, the issue of biodegradability is 
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spoilage. Again, the unconditional nature of these bans works against making such subtle 
distinctions. Finally, unconditional bans historically have been applied to isolated 
materials and packaging in a relatively unsystematic manner. This has made unconditional 
bans appear arbitrary and unfair and has severely limited their range of effect (which is 
perhaps a blessing). 
D. Reqc  line Sta ndards for Packaping 
Recycling standards are, in effect, conditional bans on materials and packaging in 
the sense that failure to comply ultimately carries the threat of market prohibition. That 
fact notwithstanding, recycling standards and unconditional bans are virtual opposites. The 
immediate objective of unconditional bans is to bar the usage of materials or packaging; 
the objective of recycling standards is to induce their usage through compliance. 
Unconditional bans are applied indiscriminately and unevenly to isolated materials; 
recycling standards are applied objectively and equally to an entire class of material use. 
Unconditional bans make, at best, a negligible and indirect contribution to the demand for 
recycling; recycling standards are specifically conditioned on achieving dramatic shifts in 
the demand for recovered materials. 
Since packaging is the largest single source of municipal solid waste (MSW), 
comprising approximately one-third of the entire municipal solid waste stream, it is there 
where recycling standards would, in all likelihood, be most productively applied. 
Furthermore, recycling standards for packaging will stimulate recycling demand for the 
major types of material used in packaging-paper, glass, plastics, steei, and aiuminum- 
whether in packaging or non-packaging applications. These materials account for sixty 
percent of MSW. By comparison, state-mandated recycled content standards for 
newspapers, while important in their own right, are restricted to one material and can 
account for no more than six percent of MSW.72 
As we visualize them, recycling standards for packaging should contain at least two 
provisions; packaging satisfying either provision would be deemed in compliance with the 
recycling standards.n The first provision is that the packaging consist of a given 
somewhat of a red herring, since none of the plastics substitutes degrade appreciably in a sanitary landfill either 
(Rathje [1989]). In addition, attempts to make plastics more biodegradable (say, by adding cornstarch to the 
polymer) will tend to make them unrecyclable. 
%ee Office of Technology Assessment (1989), page 80. 
nAdditional provisions could permit compliance by packaging reduction or packaging reuse. 
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percentage of recycled material. The second provision is that the packaging be made of 
recyclable materials-defined as those which achieve a specified statewide recycling rate, 
counting all applications of the materials, both packaging and non-packaging. The logic 
underlying the second provision is that it allows the state to leverage the requirement to 
recycle packaging to encompass the recycling of materials used in packaging, regardless of 
application. An important feature of the two provisions is their synergy, which causes the 
demand for recovered packaging materials to ratchet up. If a packaging material does not 
satisfy the threshold recycling rate to qualify as recyclable, a package can still comply by 
consisting of the specified percentage of that recycled material. However, compliance with 
the recycled content provision will also serve to increase the recycling rate of the packaging 
material toward the threshold recycling rate to qualify as recyclable. 
Recycling standards for packaging are the mechanism critical to remedying 
deficiencies in demand for recovered materials.74 As such, states need to develop an RSP 
program--however not, in our view, as a substitute for other government programs to 
promote recycling, but as the linchpin of a wide range of government activities to help 
design, stimulate, and coordinate the market for recycling. Government recycling 
activities--such as mandating separation and collection of recyclable materials, operating 
materials recycling facilities, educating consumers and businesses about solid waste 
reduction and separation opportunities, and serving as a clearinghouse of information 
about recycling markets--that heretofore were (or would be) thwarted by insufficient 
demand for recovered materials would take on added importance when complemented by 
recycling standards for packaging. Similarly, state procurement policies and economic 
charges could play a vaiuabie supporting role in stimulating the demand for recovered 
materials. Furthermore, the state may develop recycling pacts with other states or 
participate in regional recycling programs.75 Through the combination of these activities, 
state and local governments can promote the balanced growth of supply and demand in 
recycling markets, provide the stability in recycling markets that private investors require 
"%k is not to suggest that recycling standards for packaging are a perfect policy tool. They are 
subject to the common shortcomings of externally-imposed constraints. In particular, government standards are 
static in the sense that they do not automatically adjust to dynamic shifts in the economy (although the 
government can modify the standards as warranted over time), and they provide non-continuous incentives to 
the extent that economic agents are not motivated to exceed the standard (although economic charges and taxes 
can be phased in to furnish supplemental inducements). The point is that while recycling standards for 
packaging are a second-best solution, there is no first-best solution in the real world, and recycling standards for 
packaging appear vastly superior to the next best alternatives. 
751n addition, the state will surely develop special resource recovery programs for other materials-- 
such as yard wastes, batteries, white goods, and tires. 
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before making long-run financial commitments, and generally help develop a large-scale 
recycling infrastructure. 
Some might object on ideological grounds to this type of government intervention. 
However, in the case of recycling, the function of government is not to replace the market 
but to organize and maintain a market that is not independently sustainable.76 This 
concept of government's role as a generator of incentives to facilitate decentralized 
markets is being increasingly recognized.77 Furthermore, recent research has noted that 
other industrial countries derive a competitive advantage over the United States because, 
in certain markets, their governments can coordinate economic activities in such a way that 
all parties can benefit, whereas in the United States government and industry have 
traditionally been cast as antagonists.78 This need not be the case in recycling markets, 
where the active participation of government can provide positive externalities that the 
private market alone cannot duplicate. 
IbIndeed, a major consequence of government programs to promote recycling will be to get 
government out the business of disposing of solid waste and private industry into the business of recycling it. 
77See, for example, Ashford, Ayers, and Stone (1985); Reich (1988), pages 222-232; and Osborne 
(1990). In some circles, the role of government as a provider of incentives has been termed "entrepreneurial 
government," a concept which has been advocated by the Governor of Massachusetts, William Weld (see 
Osborne [lWl]). 
78See Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow (1990), pages 94-112. 
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PART THREE: 
THE EFFECT OF RECYCLING STANDARDS FOR PACKAGING IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
We have previously argued (1) that in order to achieve a substantial increase in 
recycling activity, sufficient demand must be created to absorb the additional supply of 
secondary materials, and (2) that recycling standards for packaging (RSP), or their 
equivalent, are needed to stimulate the desired expansion of demand and thereby to 
sustain a viable market for recycled materials. In addition to its contribution to increased 
recycling, however, RSP will also incur costs to design and administer, as well as impose 
compliance costs on a variety of economic actors. Thus, until the various advantages and 
disadvantages of RSP are identified and assessed, the desirability of introducing RSP in 
Massachusetts cannot be assured. 
Our objective in the following analysis is to evaluate the likely impacts of 
Massachusetts recycling standards for packaging, taking into account both microeconomic 
and macroeconomic effects. In Section A, using an applied microeconomics approach, we 
estimate the various costs and benefits of developing and implementing RSP in 
Massachusetts. Section B employs a macroeconomics perspective to examine the 
associated effects of RSP on Massachusetts employment levels and on the Massachusetts 
economy. 
Estimating the effects of a specific set of packaging recycling standards--with explicit 
conditions and timetables for compliance, terms defined, and other particulars about the 
RSP program stipulated--would itself be an ambitious task. Our task below is all the more 
difficult because we shall be evaluating the effects of recycling standards for packaging as a 
concept rather than as a detailed policy initiative. As a result, much of the analysis is, of 
- necessity, qualitative rather than quantitative. 
We assume, for purposes of analysis, that the organizing principle of an RSP 
program is to require all packaging either to be made of (a specified percentage of) 
recycled materials or made of recyclable materials (those which achieve a statewide 
recycling rate of a specified percentage). In our view, intrinsic characteristics of an RSP 
program are (1) a market-oriented approach; (2) reinforcing/synergistic features; 
(3) technical feasibility; and (4) flexibility. 
Market-oriented approach: Although RSP may be supported by other policy 
instruments--such as information/education programs, solid waste 
collection/separation systems, and economic charges--an RSP approach 
intentionally avoids government-imposed packaging solutions. Instead, subject only 
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to the constraints of RSP, businesses are permitted to choose, through the process of 
the free market, whatever packaging they find most appropriate. 
Reinforcinv /sync rrJistic features: The alternative conditions which would allow a 
iven packagin material to comply with RSP should tend to reinforce each other. 
re cling rate, the same 
s i f i e p  percentage of! 
thereby helping to satisfy 
reuse or packaging reduction criteria as a1 
Serve to promote the RSP obiecG5 - = ~  of redu 
Technical feasil)&: Candidate RSP programs should be realistic and achievable 
in the sense that businesses are able to comply with the packaging standards without 
t packa8ing provides. Evidence to support 
might include demonstrated ,aLUinment of 
r countries; the proven use of complying 
packaging in smilar applications in the marketplace; or the availability or 
impending emergence of complying packaging technologies. 
Flexibility: The RSP program should be flexible enough to exempt or to evaluate 
separately specid sub-classes of packaging materials or packaging applications. For 
example, recycliiig standards may be applied to specific plastic resins (e.g., PET) or 
even to specific applications of a plastic resin (e.g., PET bottles) where the effect of 
the RSP refinement is expected to promote recycling. Similarly, in certain 
packaging applications, where compliance with RSP is incompatible with other 
overriding social objectives, RSP exceptions should be given. One possible example 
would be packaged products which provide highly-valued services (e.g., medicines) 
but which require special packaging incompatible with RSP. Another potential 
example would be important functions of the acka ing (e.g., to prevent tampering 
with its contents) which are incompatible wit! RSj. A final possibility would be 
packaging applications for which compliance with RSP would actually damage the 
objectives of RSP (e.g., rejecting non-compiying piastic wrap for food in favor of 
alternative complying packa jng could, in princip e, lead to more solid waste 
[or example, i f a given 
t Kr- e atter condition will act 
because of the consequent ad % itional food spoilage). 39 
In the following analysis, we shall assume that any candidate RSP program possesses these 
aforementioned characteristics. 
/?he example of plastic wrap for food might equally qualify under the previous criterion, which 
concerns packaging functions incompatible with RSP. One of the central functions of most food packaging is 
the prevention of food spoilage. If the food preservation properties of plastic wrap are vastly superior to 
substitute food wrap materials, then plastic wrap for food might qualify for exemption on these grounds. (Note, 
however, that plastic wrap for food may be able to comply with recycling standards. See Stone, Ashford, and 
Lomax [1991], pages 32-34.) 
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A. The Benefits and Costs of RSP 
Five distinct types of benefits and costs of RSP are analyzed below: (1) the net 
social benefits of increased recycling of packaging material due to RSP; (2) ancillary 
benefits of RSP (in addition to increased package recycling); (3) RSP compliance costs; 
(4) administrative costs of RSP; and (5) the possibility of product withdrawals or shortages 
due to RSP. 
(1) The Net Social Benefits of Increased RecyclinP Due to RSP 
In 1989, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts generated approximately 6.6 million 
tons of municipal solid waste (MSW), which is equal to approximately 1.1 tons of MSW per 
person annually or approximately 3.1 tons of MSW per household annually.80 Of that total 
of 6.6 million tons of MSW, approximately 33.8 percent by weight,81 or 2.23 million tons, 
consisted of packaging (including container) discards. Although it is estimated that 10 
percent, by weight, of all municipal solid waste is recycled>2 a larger proportion of 
packaging discards is recycled, approximately 16 percent by weight, as calculated in Table 
6.83 Thus, currently, approximately 357,000 tons of discarded packaging in Massachusetts 
are recycled each year. 
q h e s e  estimates assume a Massachusetts population in 1989 of 5,971,000 (Massachusetts Master 
Plan [1990], page 12) and an average of 2.78 persons per household (U.S. Department of Commerce [1980], 
page 45). The estimate of 6.6 million tons of MSW for 1989 was provided in Massachusetts Master Plan (1990), 
page 12. 
81This percentage is based on national estimates (Franklin Associates [1988a] as reported in Office of 
82This percentage reflects the national average (Franklin Associates [1988a] as reported in Office of 
Technology Assessment [1989], page 6). Actually, the recycling rate for MSW in Massachusetts is below the 
national average, approximately 7 percent (Massachusetts Master Plan [1989], pages 12-13). 
8%he larger recycling rate for packaging discards in Table 6 can be solely attributed to the fact that 
the materiais comprising packaging (evaluated for a weighted average) are recycled at a higher rate than the 
average MSW material. Differential recycling rates (which could be either larger or smaller) between 
packaging and non-packaging, for a given material, are not considered in the calculations in Table 6. 
Note that the recycling rates for packaging materials listed in Column (c) of Table 6--and in Column 
(c) of Table 7 that follows-differ from those presented in Stone, Ashford, and Lomax (1991). That study, which 
addresses the feasibility of compliance with RSP, considers recycling rates as defined under proposed 
Massachusetts legislation; the quoted recycling rates for paper, aluminum, and ferrous metals include industrial 
recycling of those materials in addition to diversion from muniapal solid waste (MSW). Here, we use the 
traditional method of calculating recycling rates, ignoring industrial recycling that does not enter the MSW 
stream, because data limitations do not allow us to calculate rates of industrial recycling for all materials. 
Technology Assessment [1989], page 114). 
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(A)  
MATERIAL 
Paper 
G1 ass 
TABLE 6 
RECYCLING RATES FOR PACKAGING DISCARDS1 
(B) 
% OF PACKAGING~ 
54.5% 
22.1% 
j 
I 
P1 a s t i  cs 10.8% } 
5. g
Stee l  5.3% \ 
A1 umi num 
Other 
3.1% 1 
4.2% 
(C )  (B) X (C)  
a E C Y C L E D 3  COMPOSITE 
22% 11.99% 
10% 2.21% 
1% .ll% 
21x4 1.11% 
25% .78% 
2% .08% 
16.28% 
lThese calculations assume that, for each material, the recycling rates for packaging discards and for 
*Source: Franklin Associates (198th). 
non-packaging discards are approximately the same. For some materials, this assumption may not be realistic. 
%ource: Franklin Associates (1988a). 
%ource: Office of Technology Assessment (1989), pages 161-162. 
A central issue is what effect an RSP program will have on the level of recycling in 
Massachusetts. To some extent, this is a circular question, since its answer depends on the 
threshold recycling levels and other terms specified in any given RSP program. 
Nevertheless, at least provisionally, we shall assume that an aggressive, but realistic, RSP 
program will increase thz recycling rate for discarded packaging in Massachusetts to 50 
percent.84 Several factors lend support to this assumption. 
First, comparable rates have been achieved by other industrialized countries. 
Japan, for example, recycles between 30 and 50 percent of its MSW,85 and an even larger 
percentage of packaging materials.% 
Second, in the United States, most packaging materials, either in all or in major 
applications, have already reached or are soon anticipated to reach 50 percent recycling. 
For example, the glass industry has announced a goal of 50 percent recycled waste glass 
(cullet) usage and introduced a program to help achieve its objectiveF7 The paper industry 
has already established a goal of 40 percent recycling by 1995 (American Paper Institute 
[1990]); the introduction of RSP will permit the paper industry to raise its sights to 50 
percent recycling. The aluminum industry claims that it has already achieved an overall 
recycling rate in excess of 40 percent and a recycling rate of 60 percent for aluminum cans 
(the most significant source of aluminum in MSW).B Although only 15 percent of steel 
cans (the primary use of steel in packaging) are currently recycled nationwide, the steel 
industry has increased its recycling capacity to handle 25 percent of steel MSW, and some 
WWe note that recently proposed RSP-style programs have, in fact, advocated recycling standards of 
50 percent or more. A proposed Massachusetts initiative .petition scheduled for the state's 1990 elections (but 
overturned on a legal technicality prior to balloting) called for a threshold recycling rate of 50 percent by the 
year 2001. The Oregon Recycling Act, an initiative that was defeated in the state's 1990 elections, proposed a 
recycling rate of 60 percent by the year 2002. 
85Reasons for the wide range of reported recycling rates in Japan include different definitions of MSW 
%According to some studies, the Japanese recycle 95 percent of their newspapers, 50 percent of their 
paper products, 95 percent of their glass beer bottles, 73 percent of their aluminum cans, and 50 percent of their 
steel cans. See Kovacs (1988), page 542, and the references cited therein. 
*'See Gibboney (1990). The fact that the glass recycling rate in the United States increased from 10 
percent in 1986 to 15 percent in 1988 (Office of Technology Assessment [1989], page 150) suggests the rapidity 
with which substantial increases in recycling can be attained. 
8$ee Aluminum Association (1989) and (1990). Note, however, that other sources believe that the 
actual overall recycling rate for aluminum is substantially lower (perhaps as low as 25 percent in 1986). The 
cause of the discrepancy appears to be differing estimates of the proportion of aluminum in MSW that 
aluminum cans comprise. See Office of Technology (1989), page 153. 
and certain data deficiencies. See Office of Technology Assessment (1989), pages 136 and 203-204. 
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curbside collection programs which include steel cans have already achieved steel recycling 
rates approaching 50 percent.89 
Third, and finally, even for packaging materiabin particular, plastics--for which a 
50 percent recycling rate appears unreachable within the context of current recycling 
performance, there have been some promising developments.% In a related research 
effort, we enumerated the radical technological advances that have occurred in recent 
years in designing plastic packaging for reuse (e.g., increased environmental stress 
resistance, strengthening of polymers by addition of antioxidants, and introduction of other 
additives, such as compatibilizers, fillers, reinforcing materials, and reactive modifiers to 
promote reuse); in improving collection and resin separation (e.g., resin codes, single resin 
packaging, in-mold labeling, and floatation separation, hydroclone-based separation, and 
other separation process innovations); and in developing profitable end-markets (e.g., 
household and industrial chemical containers, corrugated piping, and trash bags).sl As a 
result, dramatic shifts in plastics recycling-both for specific resins (such as PET and 
HDPE) and overall-are possible if the proper incentives, such as RSP, 2re intr~ctuced.9~ 
Furthermore, in many applications, if the plastic packaging were unable to comply with 
RSP, other packaging materials-with equivalent or nearly-equivalent functional properties 
and similar costs--could be substituted to satisfy recycling standards. 
Assuming then that an RSP program is able to bring about a 50 percent recycling 
rate for packaging in Massachusetts, into how many tons of recycled material per year does 
this translate? Because there are two basic ways of complying with recycling standards-by 
using packaging materials that are either recyclable or recycled-the answer depends on 
how the recycling standards are satisfied, Here, we make the conservative assumption that 
all packaging in Massachusetts complies with the recycling standards by consisting of 50 
percent recycled materials.% Recall that we previously calculated that Massachusetts 
=See Apotheker (1990) and Resouxe Recycling (1990). 
%n fact, the Council of Solid Waste Solutions, an industry group formed by major plastics concerns, is 
planning to announce a recyclimg goal of 25 percent of all plastics packaging by 1995. See WuN Street Joumal 
(1991). 
91See Stone, Ashford, and Lomax (1991). 
=For example, PET bottles have achieved a material recovery rate in excess of 20 percent nationwide 
(Modem Plastics [1990], page 32). In Massachusetts, because of its bottle return law, the PET bottle recycling 
rate iS estimated to be 80 percent (Brewer [1989]). 
%If, instead, packaging satisfied recycling standards by being made of recyclable materials, clearly the 
total amount of recycling in Massachusetts would be larger, since then the types of materials used in packaging- 
both in packaging and non-packaging applications--would have to be in compliance. Note that the assumption 
of compliance solely by means of recycled content was made only for the purpose of establishing a lower bound 
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generates approximately 2.23 million tons of packaging discards each year. For recycled 
materials to comprise 50 percent of those 2.23 million tons, in compliance with RSP, 
requires a total of 1,115,000 tons of MSW to be recycled. Since packaging currently 
accounts for approximately 357,000 tons of recycling, as previously calculated, an 
additional 758,000 tons of recycled MSW per year can he attributed to the RSP program. 
Earlier, we calculated that the net social benefit derived from the recycling of 
packaging material is $231 per ton and determined that a major justification for 
implementing an RSP program is to sustain the value of recycled materials in the market.97 
Based on this $231 per ton figure, the net social benefits of RSP associated with the 
additional 758,000 tons per year of recycled MSW are approximately $175,000,000 
annually. 
estimate of the effect of an RSP program on recycling levels. It is assuredly not a behavioral prediction of how 
industry will actually choose to comply with recycling standards (since we anticipate a significant percentage of 
compliance will be achieved through use of recyclable materials). 
9% theory, the municipal solid waste that is recycled need not come from Massachusetts, so that the 
benefits of a Massachusetts recycling program might only partially accrue to Massachusetts. However, as 
explained in the subsequent analysis of macroeconomic effects in Section B, this possibility will not arise in 
practice. 
95Recall that this estimate was based on national recycling rates. Since the recycling rate in 
Massachusetts is beiow the nationai average, current packaging recyciing is presumabiy iess than 357,uoO tons 
annually. Our estimate of the increased recycled packaging due to RSP-equal to the difference between RSPs 
threshold level and the current level--will be correspondingly understated. 
%These calculations obviously ignore the dampening effect of RSP exemptions on recycling activity. 
However, that effect should be offset, more or less, by the fact that some packaging will exceed the threshold 
level of recycling required for RSP compliance. 
wThe $231 per ton estimate of the net social benefits of recycling includes all effects captured in 
market transactions as well as all externalities associated with solid waste disposal. Embedded in the market 
effects are trade-offs in the quality and production costs of recycled versus virgin materials. These are reflected 
in the price obtained for recycled materials (relative to the price for virgin materials). What is not contained in 
the $231 per ton figure is externalities in primary materials extraction and processing relative to those in 
secondary materials collection and processing. Prominent examples of externalities in these markets are air 
pollution, water pollution, and the consumption of depletable energy resources (to the extent that the price of 
energy does not fully capture the scarcity value of depletable resources used in energy production). In general, 
the process of producing a ton of secondary material requires much less energy (Office of Technology 
Assessment [1989], pages 142-184, Kovacs [1988], page 544; and Stauffer [1989]) and causes much less air and 
water pollution (Wiika [1988], pages 29-32) than does the process of producing a ton of virgin material. As a 
result, the $231 per ton estimate will tend to understate the true net benefits of recycling. 
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(2) Ancillary Benefits of RSP 
In addition to increasing the proportion of recycled materials in packaging, an RSP 
program will provide a variety of ancillary benefits, including those from reduced 
packaging, packaging reuse, and packaging material recycling. Although we use the term 
"ancillary" benefits, there is no reason they might not exceed in magnitude the 
aforementioned benefits from recycled packaging. 
(a) Packaging Reduction 
An RSP program should contain packaging reduction criteria, which would serve as 
an alternative to recycling standards. Thus, a firm could comply with RSP simply by 
reducing its packaging (per unit of product) by a specified amount (not necessarily as much 
as 50 percent). 
There is good reason for including packaging reduction criteria as part of an RSP 
program.98 In the hierarchy of solid waste management practices, source reduction, which 
encompasses packaging reduction, has top priority; recycling has second priority.99 The 
logic underlying this hierarchy is compelling: it is preferable simply to eliminate 
unnecessary packaging rather than to recycle it. The preference given packaging reduction 
is indicated by its net social benefits-:$281 per ton--relative to the net social benefits of 
recycling--$231 per ton--as derived in Part One. The $50 difference between the two 
reflects the costs of solid waste collection which must be incurred prior to recycling but 
which are avoidable fm eliriiizited packaging.1" 
__1_/ 
y5Note, however, that the packaging reduction criteria need not be in the form of standards that 
parallel recycling standards. Because of the administrative costs of measuring a packaging reduction and 
because of the possibility of Perverse outcomes (the firms best able to meet packaging reduction criteriazre c those with the most excessive packaging; manufacturers who have previously eliminated excessive packaging 
might be punished for their good efforts), it-may be peferable to deal with packaging reduction on a case-by- 
-e (or, possibly, on an --- industq-by-indqtG) basis as gro-G&-for exemdon rather &an as a parallerle&latiGe 
standard. O n  the other hand, such perverse outcomes could be avoided by crediting a firm with packaging 
reductions that it undertook voluntarily prior to the legal requirement to do so. Appending this type of 
grandfather clause to packaging reduction standards would probably minimize the need for extensive 
exemptions. 
WSee, for example, Massachusetts Master Plan (1989), page 11. See also Caldart and Ryan (1985), 
l%e avoided costs of producing the packaging do not contribute to the social benefits of packaging 
reduction (relative to packaging recycling) because, for the marginal unit of packaging eliminated, its 
production costs are presumed to be just equal to its functional value. 
- I--T--- 
which discusses the primacy of source reduction as a strategy to reduce hazardous waste. 
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We make no attempt here to quantify the total social benefits to be obtained from 
RSP-induced packaging reduction. However, the opportunities to reduce packaging would 
appear to be plentiful. To cite just one example, consider microwave packaging. Many 
manufacturers of microwave foods include a disposable (usually plastic) microwave 
cooking tray, which typically accounts for well over half of the microwave packai,ing by 
weight. Elimination of these disposable cooking trays would be a costless way of conplying 
with RSP. Consumers would simply place the microwave food in a glass101 tray of 
standardized size, which could be purchased separately and reused innumerable times. 
(b) Packaging Reuse 
A second type of ancillary benefit will arise from packaging reuse criteria, which 
should also be included in an RSP program as an alternative to recycling standards. 
"Discarded (or returned) packaging that is reused a specified number of times would 
accordingly be considered to be in compliance with RSP. The net social benefits per ton of 
packaging reuse may be greater than, equal to, or less than those of package recycling- 
depending on their relative costs of collection and processing, how often the packag'ng is 
reused, and the disposition of the packaging when it can no longer be reused. We 
anticipate that the opportunities for packaging reuse are far less pervasive than those for 
packaging reduction, but some niches for packaging reuse do exist (particularly in cases 
where the other RSP options cannot be satisfied). One emerging example is reusable 
polyethylene foam stuffing employed to package fragile computer equipment. The crucial 
factor in facilitating reuse is the computer packaging collection and distribution system 
developed by computer companies and plastics manufacturers.102 
------- 
(c) Packaging Material Recycling 
Increased recycling of packaging material is another ancillary benefuhat will be 
triggered by an RSP program. We previously assumed that packaging would comply with 
RSP by consisting of 50 percent recycled content. However, businesses might instead 
choose to comply with RSP by using recyclable packaging materials-those that are 
lUIGlass is a superior microwavable material. Components of plastic microwave trays, including toxic 
plastic monomers, cyclic PET trimmers, plasticizers, and adhesives, have been found to leach into food during 
the microwave heating process. Elimination of the disposable plastic trays would also eliminate this consumer 
health hazard. 
102See Stone, Ashford, and Lomax (lWl), pages 28-29. 
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achieving a statewide recycling rate of 50 percent. For example, in order for a package 
made of paper to comply with the recyclability standard, 50 percent of all the discarded 
paper in Massachusetts, regardless of application (in other words, not just discarded paper 
packaging) would have to be recycled. To extend I__ _" the example, the recyclability criterion 
might lead !o efforts to increase office paper recycling in order to achieve the-threshold 
r e e - r s j c  fur paper. n u s ,  the recyclability criterion effectively leverages the recycling 
of discarded packaging to encompass the recycling of discarded package materials from all 
applications. 
We can estimate the potential magnitude of these leveraged benefits with 
reasonable accuracy. As indicated earlier in Table 6, paper, glass, plastics, steel, and 
aluminum comprise over 95 percent of packaging. Column@) of Table 7 shows that these 
five packaging materials account for 60 percent of the 6.6 million tons of MSW generated 
in Massachusetts each year, equal to approximately 4 million tons annually. If all 
packaging were to comply with the recyclability criterion, 50 percent of all paper, glass, 
plastic, steel, and aluminum discards in the state would have to be recycled, a total of 
approximately 2 million tons annually. _--_ The last column of Table 7 reveals that 
aurently recycled.103 Thus, in 
Massachusetts, of the 4 million tons of these materials discarded each year, approximately 
+; 
4 Z J  
% 2 4 6  
I, ' 
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700,000 tons are recycled annual&. In addition, we previously estimated that the benefits 
7 59,000 of RSP, assuming packaging attained 50 percent recycled content, would be 758,000 tons. 
1oo;ooa .Satisfying the recyclability standard, which would involve a total of 2 million tons of 
recycled packaging materials, would therefore require an additional 542,000 tons of 
recycling annuaiiy. Based on the estimate of $Zi per ton as the net social benefit of 
recycling packaging material, the potential leveraged benefits of RSP due to the 
recyclability criterion are approximately an additional $125,OOo,oO0. 
hese leveraged benefits are realized depends on the proportion 
of packaging that complies with the recyclability criterion rather than with the recycled 
content criterion. If all packaging complies with the recycled content standard, then the 
social benefits will be $175,000,000 h". l ly .  If all packaging complies with the 
recyclability standard, then the total leveraged benefits will be $300,000,000 annually 
- 
a ,000 ,e 
' Po 
54x,oao 
($175,000,000 of which would come at the expense of reduced recycled content benefits). 
Obviously, if some packaging complies with the recycled content standard and the 
1u5Agah, we note that this estimate reflects the national average. Applying this percentage to 
Massachusetts will tend to overestimate the state's recycling rate for these materials (and subsequently 
underestimate the leveraged benefits from the recyclability criterion), since the recycling rate in Massachusetts 
is below the national average. 
TABLE 7 
(A) . 
HATE RIAL, 
Paper 
G1 ass 
P1 as t ics  
Steel 
A1 umi num 
RECYCLING RATES FOR MAJOR MATERIALS 
USED I N  PACKAGING 
(B) 
36% 
8% 
7% 
8.5% 
a 
60% 
(C) (D) (C) X (D)  
MATERIAL % RECYCLED3 COMPOSITE 
60% 22% 13.20% 
% OF P A C K A ~ N G  
13% 10% 1.13% 
12% 1% .12% 
14% 21x4 2.94% 
1% 25% 
17.64% 
k30urce: Office of Technology Assessment (1989), page 5. 
*Percentages in Column (c) are equal to Column (b) divided by .6, which is the sum of the percentages 
3Source: Franklin Associates (1988a). 
%ource: Office of Technology Assessment (1989), pages 161-162. 
in Column @). 
remainder complies with the recyclability standard, then the total social benefits will fall 
somewhere between $175,000,000 and $300,000,000 annually. 
(3) RSP Compliance Costs 
RSP compliance costs are the additional costs that firms incur to make their 
packaging meet packaging recycling standards. Of course, a major component of RSP 
compliance costs-firms' costs of using recycled material rather than virgin material in 
packaging (in order to satisfy the recycled content provisions of RSP)--is included as part of 
the net social benefits of recycling, previously estimated to equal $231 per ton. However, 
firms will also incur costs to become acquainted with the provisions of the RSP program, to 
learn about and to evaluate packaging alternatives, and to modify aspects of production in 
order to comply with RSP. 
For a variety of reasons, we CI e z c t  L._ these -1-- comqliance _^I costs . . , .  to be-small. First, a 
significant proportion of packaging is prodiced by large packagers or purchased by large 
manufacturers for whom the informaticlna,l costs of the RSP program should be 
negligible.104 Second,$nce the RSP program is initiated, developers and manufacturers of 
compliant packaging will surely market their products aggressively. In other words, most 
packaging buyers need not devote extensive resources to familiarize themselves with the 
RSP program, to interpret how RSP affects their business, or to search for complying 
packaging; p m w  ith RSP solutions will pro-~dshese se rvices in ord er to attract Dew 
c;ustome_rs. Thirehome packaging is already in compliance with RSP. Manufacturers and 
buyers of such packaging need not incur any product or process modification costs. Foiirth, 
0 businesses are continuously changing their packaging independently of RSP, as part of their 
ongoing need to market products creatively. On average, firms modify their packaging 
every two to three years,l05 so that packaging changes to comply with RSP can be 
incorporated as part of the regular process of packaging revision. Therefore, dead-weight 
losses associated with having to scrap packaging prematurely will generally not arise. Fifth, 
other impending packaging legislation--intended to eliminate lead, cadmium, mercury, and 
other heavy metals from packaging so as to reduce environmental hazards in disposal or 
lU4For example, International Paper, the largest U.S. packaging company, had domestic packaging 
sales of two billion dollars in 1984. The 50 largest U.S. packagers accounted for approximately half of the 
domestic packaging sales in 1984 (Rauch Associates [1986], pages 3-10). Large purchasers of packaging include 
firms such as Anheuser-Busch (the nation's largest consumer of packaging) and McDonalds. The informational 
costs of an RSP program would be a trivial amount in relation to these firms' revenues. 
losSee Tufts University (1988), pages 33-34. 
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recycling--will cause significant changes in packaging (particularly in pigments and inks and 
in materials additives).lM Again, firms' reappraisal of their packaging in response to such 
environmental legislation geared toward packaging provides a relatively costless 
opportunity to consider RSP-inspired modifications at the same time. 
In addition, two by-products of RSP compliance will tend to minimize, or even 
offset, RSP compliance costs. The first is joint production efficiencie3, simultaneous and 
inseparable productivity improvements associated with RSP compliance. As an example, 
when AT&T recently changed its telephone and answering machine packaging, using 
corrugated cardboard in place of Styrofoam (for product protection) to promote 
environmental objectives, the company was able, at the same time, to make its packaged 
products approximately one quarter smaller, since the corrugated cardboard is much less 
bulky than the Styrofoam. As a result, AT&T is able to save on product shipping costs and 
the costs of hauling discarded packaginyg, - and retailers. are able to save on shelf space.107 - _  
As another example, some firms will make productivity improvements that, although 
causally related to RSP compliance efforts, are not necessary to satisfy RSP. The classic 
reason for this phenomenon is indivisibilities in investment decisions; it is generally less 
costly to make multiple changes in production simultaneously rather than individually.108 
Therefore, an RSP program will provide the stimulus to make other production 
improvements, not justified or not perceived in isolation, in concert with compliance 
efforts. 
The second positive by-product of RSP compliance is packaping and recycling 
innovations. A variety of research has demonstrated that regulation (or legislation) can 
stimulate the i_n_n_nvative perf~nrmanre of industry.109 The regdatims mmt likely to elicit 
an innovative response are those that set stringent standards, provide industry with 
maximum flexibility in meeting those standards, and are targeted at industries with the 
capacity to innovate. 
"See, in particular, the model legislation proposed by the Coalition of Northeast Governors 
(CONEG) Source Reduction Task Force. In response to the model legislation, New Jersey (one of 
Massachusetts's CONEG partners) has already adopted a bill--State of New Jersey Senate Committee 
Substitute for Senate Bill No. 2261, Adopted September 24, 1990-whose purpose is to reduce the amount of 
toxic packaging and whose recommended methods specifically include banning the distribution or sale of toxic 
packaging in New Jersey. 
lo7See Boston Herald (March 13,1990). 
108See, for example, Ashford and Caldart (1991), pages 242-243. 
lWSce, in particular, Ashford, Ayers, and Stone (1985) and the references cited therein. For an 
examination of the innovation process itself, see Ashford and Stone (1991). 
51 
The type of RSP program under consideration here has precisely those 
characteristics. By setting ambitious, but achievable recycling targets and raising the 
possibility of packaging bans for non-compliance, stringent recycling standards will create 
market-driven, demand-pull opportunities for technical change.110 In addition, RSP does 
not impose a specific packaging technology, but rather, allows businesses the flexibility of 
meeting any one of several alternative recycling criteria and, subject to the particular 
criterion selected, of using whatever packaging they prefer. Furthermore, the packaging 
industry is highly innovative.111 By adding recycling dimensions to previous design 
considerations, an RSP program will "increase the problem space"ll2 of the packager, 
thereby redirecting innovative activity toward simpler and more recyclable packaging. 
Finally, we note that the truly remarkable number of significant product and process 
innovations in the packaging and recycling industries in recent years has been due, at least 
in part, to the threat of possible packaging and materials bans and other stringent 
regulations in various cities and states throughout the United States. 
While we make no attempt to quantify the joint production efficiencies and 
packaging and recycling innovations associated with RSP, we anticipate their benefits will 
be widespread and substantial. 
(4) The Administrative Costs o f RSP 
RSP administrative costs are transaction costs that accompany an RSP program. 
They include the government's costs of developing, supervising, and enforcing an RSP 
program, as well a the c ~ c t c  businesses incur in order to verify and demonstrate their 
compliance. 
liUEvidence from the effects of other stringent regulations supports this conclusion. For example, 
when the manufacture of polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") was prohibited, industry responded by developing 
five PCB substitutes, constituting radical and comprehensive product innovations. In other cases, industry has 
found substitutes for lead used in gasoline and paints, for mercury in oil-based paints, and for the pesticide 
DDT. Conversely, regulation that is too lax discourages innovation; instead it elicits adoption of on-the-shelf 
technology (and usually add-on technology, such as an end-of-pipe pollution control device, which minimizes 
the technological response of the firm). See Ashford, Ayers, and Stone (1985), pages 429-443, and Ashford and 
Stone (1991). 
ll1As an indication of the packaging industws innovative performance, consider its response to the 
series of poisonings from tampered Tylenol bottles, To protect consumers and to eliminate their own potential 
liability exposure, the packaging industry moved quickly to develop and widely adopt tamper-proof packaging 
for food and drug products. 
l12See Allen et uf. (1978). 
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Because of its heavy reliance on market solutions, we anticipate that RSP will 
minimize the government's involvement in firms' packaging decisions and keep 
administrative costs to a modest level. While significant resources may go into structuring 
an RSP program and in working out the details of its operation, such planning involves only 
a one-time effort, whose expense should be negligible when amortized over the life of the 
recycling program. In terms of everyday RSP functions, we envision the role of government 
being limited primarily to calculating recycling rates, evaluating possible packaging 
exemptions, and enforcing recycling standards. Regular calculation of recycling rates 
should involve only minor expenses and would be a valuable contribution to any recycling 
initiative, not just RSP. In principle, government could be swamped b, costly exemption 
requests. In practice, however, they are likely to be few in number and easy to process. 
Government's 
information-gathering and adjudicative expenses in processing exemption claims should 
therefore be minimal. Similarly, enforcement activities will probably be conducted mainly 
by private parties rather than government. Packaging competitors ard public interest 
groups will find it in their interest to monitor the performance of packagers and to notify 
the government of RSP violations. Government can therefore focus its enforcement 
activities on the relatively low-cost tasks of verifying and penalizing reported RSP 
violations. 
We should note, in addition, that the increased recycling occasioned by RSP will, 
Massachusetts. Consequently, the government's costs of administering an RSP program 
will be offset, to a greater or lesser degree, by corresponding reductions in its costs of 
administering other environmental programs--in particular, those associated with the siting, 
construction, and operation of solid waste facilities and those associated with the clean up 
of air, water, and land resources damaged by toxic releases from solid waste disposal 
facilities. 
Nor should businesses bear significant transaction costs to confirm their compliance 
with RSP (and most of those costs will be temporary, occurring during the period when the 
RSP program is first being activated). In principle, the one vulnerable party would be 
retailers, who might have serious difficulty in determining whether the packaged goods they 
receive from manufacturers and distributors, particularly those from out of state, are in 
compliance with RSP. Again, in practice, these potential transaction costs will not 
materialize, since retailers will simply develop standard contract language requiring their 
suppliers to assume liability for any and all costs and penalties arising from delivered 
'i 
The reason is that, in order to expand their market share, competitors who have developed / \p i 3,- J- 
% * 
compliant packaging will challenge unwarranted requests for exemptions. 'r, 2 
over time, result in a reduction in the number of solid waste facilities needed in ' k  1 9 
i'h 
1 
I % %  <, I 
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packaging in violation of RSP. As to the transaction costs that complying packagers will 
incur in order to monitor the compliance of their competitors and to challenge their 
competitors' unwarranted claims for exemptions, we need not concern ourselves since the 
market will compensate them for their efforts in the form of additional business. In that 
sense, an RSP program will impose a self-regulating, efficient level of transaction costs on 
business. 
ibilitv of Product Withdrawals or Shortages Due to RSP ( 5 )  ThePoss 
Whatever the benefits of an RSP program, they would surely prove insufficient were 
one of the consequences of RSP to be the withdrawal of products from the market or the 
emergence of discernible product shortages. It is important to consider, therefore, whether 
such deleterious results might not follow from the imposition of recycling standards. 
It so happens that the prospect of products being withdrawn from the market or of 
product shortages is raised by industry virtually every time it is confronted with stringent 
regulation. For example, when the use of fully halogenated chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") 
i n  aerosol sprays was banned, manufacturers claimed that many aerosol products would 
have to be withdrawn from the market. In reality, the chemical industry developed a non- 
fluorocarbon propellent using C02  and firms outside the chemical industry developed a 
new pumping system (called "the pump") not dependent on propellents and cheaper than 
CFC propellents.113 The only thing withdrawn from the market was what the regulators 
'ntended to be withdrawn--CFCs in aerosol sprays. The actual outcome is invariably the 
\ unwelcome product withdrawals or shortages never materialize. What prevents groduct 
w i t h d . "  sho rtages, of course, is the functioning of economic markets. The - essence 
qf a market svstem is its abili& to adapt to change. Changing factor prices or the 
imposition of resource constraints, for instance, create profitable opportunities for 
economic agents to satisfy the unmet demand arising from these market disturbances. 
The equilibrating properties of the market will surely operate in response to 
recycling standards. Manufacturers of compliant packaging will rush in to filr the void left 
by non-compliant competitors, and packaging entrepreneurs will develop novel packaging 
solutions that better incorporate the new realities of the marketplace. In fact, several 
features of an RSP program make the threat of product withdrawals or product shortages 
even more remote than usual. First, compliance with recvcling standards will be technically 
-..Ln+:+..+am F, +ha ram.ln+aA m..L+nmrm owa gnllnA nw AnllnlnneA a n A  JUUJLlLULCD 1Ul LUG lGgUlC%LGU 3 U U D L C U A b b  Q1b L V U A I U  U1 U ~ V ~ I U y Y U ,  llU in eveq L O G .  ( 
- 
ll%ee Ashford, Ayers, and Stone (1985), pages 433-434. 
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feasible; there is no risk that necessary packaging innovations will not be forthcoming. 
Second, the packaging industry is dynamic; it is characterized by frequent product redesign. 
By giving packagers and package buyers several years to respond to recycling standards, no 
product dislocations need occur. Third, in rare cases where compliant packaging is not 
available without compromising important packaging functions, the RSP program specifies 
that exe2tions - be - - __ granted. Finally, manufacturers do not really have the option of 
abandoning Massachusettsmarkets. What business would choose to exit a market the size 
xo <of Massachusetts when its competitors are ready and able to absorb its customers? 
pp. Furthermore, the imposition of packaging recycling standards is not an isolated event 
restricted to Massachusetts. A multitude of cities and states are confronting business with 
the threat of packaging restrictions, many of which--such as unqualified materials bans-- 
would be far less desirable to industry than an RSP program. 
Simply put, there will be no vacant shelves in Massachusetts as the result of an RSP 
program. 
-
G. 
“b 
Summary of the Microeconomic Effects o f RSP 
We have argued that an RSP program in Massachusetts will be able to achieve a 50 
percent ’recycling rate for packaging. Under the conservative assumption that packaging 
will comply with recycling standards by consisting of 50 percent recycled content, then the 
associated social benefits of RSP in Massachusetts will be $175,000,000 annually. In 
addition, an RSP program in Massachusetts will provide ancillary benefits from reduced 
packaging, from packaging reuse, a n d 4  firms compiy with the recyciabie packaging 
material standard (rather than with the recycled content standard)--from the recycling of 
packaging material in non-packaging applications. The last of these ancillary benefits 
alone could increase the social benefits of RSP by an additional $125,000,000 annually. 
We have also found that the compliance costs of an RSP program are likely to be 
low and will be at least partially negated by joint production efficiencies and packaging and 
recycling innovations arising in response to RSP. Furthermore, we anticipate that the 
administrative costs of an RSP program will be modest because of RSPs reliance on 
market solutions and on the initiatives of private economic actors. Finally, an RSP 
program will not lead to product withdrawals or shortages. 
We conclude that whatever the administrative and compliance costs of an RSP 
program, they will be more than offset by the ancillary benefits previously enumerated. 
Therefore, the net social benefits of an RSP program in Massachusetts should be at least 
$175,000,000 annually and might well reach $300,000,000 annually. 
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B. The Effects o f RSP on Massachusetts Employne nt and on the Massachusetts Economy 
We next consider the effects of an RSP program on Massachusetts employment and 
on the Massachusetts economy. Following some introductory comments concerning 
common pitfalls to avoid in conducting an analysis of macroeconomic impacts, we identify 
the net social 
bgefits of an RSP program, ,and (2) those arising from industry-specific effects of RSP ,as 
and evaluate two distinct tyFes of effects at work: (1) those indu.cd.ly -I- 
/ 
reflected in Massachusetts. --7 En addition, we briefly consider some broader economic and 
non-economic effects of an RSP program. 
(1) General Caveats 
The assessment of macroeconomic effects, and particularly employment effects, is 
susceptible to abuse, sometimes by those with special interests in the outcome, sometimes 
by the sincere, but faulty reasoning of the analyst. In order to anticipate and thereby to 
forestall such abuse, we should like to preface our analysis of the macroeconomic effects of 
RSP with an examination of the types of specious and superficial reasoning to be avoided. 
To illustrate the principles involved, we begin by presenting "the fallacy of the broken 
window." We then consider the principles in more abstract terms and apply them to the 
macroeconomic analysis of an RSP program. 
Suppose a malicious youth hurls a rock through the window of a grocery store. In 
considering the consequences of this destructive act, it is easy to conceive of a positive side 
as well. After all, the broken window will make some business for the glazier who replaces 
it. Furthermore, with the money received from the grocer, the glazier will purchase goods 
and services from other merchants, and these merchants will therefore have more to spend 
with still other merchants. The broken window will provide income and employment in 
ever-widening circles. The logical conclusion, according to this reasoning, is that the youth 
who threw the rock, far from being a public menace, is actually a public benefactor. 
The flaw in this reasoning is that it is incomplete. It is true, of course, that the act of 
vandalism will create additional business for some glazier. But what has not been 
ll%ee Hazlitt (1%2), pages 15-17. 
56  
considered is the merchandise--say, a new suit--the grocer was planning to purchase, but 
because of the cost of the replacement window, he will have to do without. In addition, the 
clothier's lost business will mean he has less to spend with other merchants, who will 
therefore have less to spend with still other merchants, and so on ad infinitum. In short, 
the glazier's gain of business is merely the clothier's loss of business. No additional income 
or employment has been created by the broken window. Furthermore, the grocer--the 
victim of the vandalism--is clearly worse off. Instead of a window and the new suit he was 
planning to buy, the grocer must now be content with only the window. Similarly, society 
has lost a new suit that might otherwise have come into being, and is just that much poorer. 
(b) Applications to the Analysis of RSP 
Perhaps the fallacy of attributing benefits to employment gains from destructive acts 
is so obvious as not to require explanation. Nevertheless, the analytic principles used to 
expose fallacies of this type are worth enumerating and examining within the context of an 
RSP program. 
One fundamental principle is that analysis of a policy requires tracing the long-run 
consequences of that policy for all economic sectors, not merely the immediate effects of 
the policy or the effects on only one economic sector. It is virtually impossible to think of 
any policy or change in economic activity that doesn't involve some observable business or 
job loss for somebody. For example, the introduction of quartz-crystal watches harmed the 
manufacturers of spring-movement watches; video cassette recorders and the availability of 
i d e o  cassettes of movies injured movie theater sales( personal computers and word- 
processing software damaged the typewriter business; and so on. Therefore, simply 
identifymg those economic agents who might be harmed by a policy does not by itself 
provide grounds for rejecting that policy; the main issue is whether the harms created by 
the policy can be justified by the benefits. 
In the case of an RSP program, it is clear that some manufacturers of non-compliant 
packaging (those whose packaging is sold in Massachusetts-and who are unable to modify 
the packaging they produce to achieve compliance) will lose business and employees. But 
tho-, S w 'll__be offset by the additional business and employment created for 
manufacturers of recyclable or recycled-content packaging. Thus, recycling standards will 
result n o h  , u . in a diversion of jobs to recycling activities and to the 
manufacture of recycled productsTnd packaging. If the transition to an RSP program is 
smooth enough, employment opportunities should adjust so that most workers who 
4 3 4  tLQgL. 
I
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temporarily lose jobs will find alternative employment through a series of employment 
moves involving other workers in the economy. 
Just because an economic agent is "affected by a policy or change in economic 
activity doesn't necessarily mean that that economic agent, or others, will lose their job as a 
result. In the case of an RSP program, the manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of 
products sold in Massachusetts whose packaging is not currently in compliance will surely 
be "affected by the recycling standards. Furthermore, the way in which Massachusetts 
businesses and households dispose of their packaging and other solid waste is likely to be 
"affected as well. But that is precisely the purpose of the recycling standards: to provide 
incentives to alter behavior in ways that promote recycling. Thus, the consequence of 
"affecting" these economic agents is not lost business or employment, but rather 
compliance. 
One might infer from the preceding discussion that public policy, such as an RSP 
program, is incapable of affecting employment levels or the level of economic activity in 
Massachusetts. Such a conclusion would obviously be incorrect, as the analysis below will 
demonstrate by example. Before examining the probable effects of recycling standards on 
the Massachusetts economy, however, we should make clear one important point. 
Although the net effect of an RSP program will be to create jobs in Massachusetts, that fact 
may be scant consolation to those few workers who might lose their job because of 
recycling standards and not find alternative employment. It would be callous to dismiss the 
ly, we encourage the state to take special efforts to 
assist any non-compliant manufacturers in shifting their business activities to compliant 
products and packaging, if possibie, or to provide retraining assistance for their displaced 
workers. 
----fate of these individuals. ." - u
__ -- -__ - __ ~ - -__/ - -- -__I___.__-- -. - __ -_ - -. 
--- _ _  ____- ---  - - 1-
(2) Social Benefits of RSP: Real and Implicit Tax Reductiou 
A major effect of recycling standards on the Massachusetts economy and on 
employment in Massachusetts is directly related to the net social benefits arising from an 
RSP program. To see this, recall that the net social benefits of recycling consist primarily 
of the avoided out-of-pocket and imputed costs of solid waste disposal. The out-of-pocket 
costs of solid waste disposal are, for the most part, paid for by the state and its 
municipalities, but the revenues to cover these expenses are generated from taxes borne by 
is generally a poor strategy for the state to attempt to protect inefficient firms or jobs in 
inefficient industries. The benefits are illusory and the costs are self-perpetuating. A far better approach is to 
help improve the performance of inefficient f m s  or industries or to help shift economic activity to more 
productive industries in the state. 
58 
Massachusetts businesses and households. Therefore, every dollar an RSP program saves 
Massachusetts in solid waste disposal expenditures directly translates into a dollar 
reduction in tax burden for Massachusetts taxpayers.116 In the case of the imputed costs of 
solid waste disposal, Massachusetts citizens pay an implicit tax in the form of disposal- 
related environmental hazards and disamenities. Stated differently, the implicit tax is 
equal to the additional cost Massachusetts citizens must incur to achieve a given level of 
environmental safety and amenities. 
We previously determined that a conservative estimate of the net social benefits of 
an RSP program is $175,000,000 annually and that the net social benefits could reach 
$300,000,000 annually. Of the net social benefits of recycling, approximately 42 percent i s  
associated with the avoided out-of-pocket costs of solid waste disposal (after all direct 
benefits derived from solid waste disposal are subtracted out) and the remaining 58 percent 
is derived from the avoided imputed costs of solid waste disposal.117 Thus, assuming 
annual social benefits of $175,000,000 from RSP, approximately $75,000,000 will be due to 
avoided out-of-pocket expenses from solid waste disposal, and $100,000,000 will be due 10 
avoided imputed costs from solid waste disposal. Were the net social benefits of an RSY 
program $300,000,000 annually, approximately $125,OOO,OOO would come from avoided out- 
of-pocket expenses and $175,000,000 from the avoided imputed costs of solid waste 
disposal. 
Based on these figures, the net social benefits of an RSP program translate into a 
tax reduction of from $75,000,000 to $125,000,000 annually for Massachusetts businesses 
and households and an additional implicit tax benefit of from $100,000,000 to $175,000,000 
"implicit" tax benefit, from a reduction in imputed solid waste disposal costs, may actually 
appear in the form of real out-of-pocket savings. For example, to the extent that the 
environmental hazards from solid waste disposal lead to adverse health consequecces, the 
annually fcr h<asach;setts ci:izers. U J n  P h n q a l A  LTdhnr m n t n  thnt -..oh n $ * r r h n t  t n v m  thn 
T V  b aiiuuiu LUI uibi I L U L ~  u i a L  I ~ I U ~ L L  UL w i i u ~  w b  ~ b i  111 U L ~  
llbNeedless to say, just because state and municipal operating costs are reduced does not guarantee 
that taxes will be correspondingly lowered. However, it is reasonable to assume that, over time, state and 
municipal taxes will tend to match their respective liabilities (net of other revenues and transfer payments). 
Even were taxes not reduced, the benefits of an RSP program will allow the state and municipal governments to 
fund other needed services. 
l17As calculated in Part One, of the net social benefits of $231 per ton of recycling, the avoided cost of 
environmental hazards and disamenities is $160 per ton of solid waste incinerated (including $21 of the $44 for 
the l andf i ig  of incinerator ash) and $75 per ton of solid waste landfiied. Since it is predicted that, on average, 
70 percent of solid waste will be incinerated and 30 percent landfiied, the composite avoided cost of 
environmental hazards and disamenities is $134 per ton of recycling, which is equal to approximately 58 percent 
of the $231 social benefit per ton of recycling. The residual 42 percent, or $97 per ton of recycling, is due to the 
avoided out-of-pocket expenses of solid waste disposal. 
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imputed benefits of recycling standards will be embodied in reduced medical treatment 
These real and implicit tax reductions brought about by an RSP program will serve 
to stimulate the Massachusetts economy and employment. Tax reductions (without 
Torresponding loss of services) will attract both workers and industry to the state. People 
will find Massachusetts a more desirable place irr which to live and work because lower 
taxes reduce their real cost of living in the state. Yndustry will be attracted to the state by 
the lower. cost of doing business (both because of diminished business tax payments and 
because workers can be hired for lower wages wfen their real cost of living is lessened). 
Such tax benefits from an RSP program would bc of special relief to Massachusetts at a 
time when the state is burdened by serious budget deficits and a reputation for excessive 
taxation.119 
costs and fewer work-loss days.118 -\ _ -  
(3) Industry-Specific Effects of RSP as Reflected in Massachusetts 
The other major effect of an RSP program on the Massachusetts economy and on 
employment in Massachusetts is related to how recycling standards alter the level of 
l d i c a l  care costs are heavily subsidized by government, some of these imputed 
benefits of an RSP program will actually further reduce the tax burden of Massachusetts taxpayers. See 
Ashford and Caldart (1991), page 229. 
ll%e have intentionally avoided developing formal estimates of the effects of RSP social benefits on 
the Massachusetts economy and employment partially because of the uncertainties involved (e.g., such as the 
form in which the benefits of an RSP program will be reflected in Massachusetts's fiscal policy), partially 
because of the difficulty in doing so (e.g., it is unclear how to treat the macroeconomic effects of reduced 
environmental hazards and disamenities, which provide implicit but generally not actual tax savings), and 
partially because we do not want to commit the types of analytic abuses that we previously cautioned against. 
However,ynder the assumDtion that the benefits of an RSP Droeram would have the same effect as an 
x 8 ,  we can develop rough estimates of the associated macroeconomic 
effects. The crucial variables in the estimation are the economic and employment multipliers in response to a 
tax reduction. Based on simulations using the Brookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States, 
the GNP multiplier for a tax reduction is approximately 1.4 for the United States (Duesenberry et al. [1969], 
pages 481-491). Thus, the $175,000,000 to $3OO,OOO,000 annual social benefits of an RSP program, if they 
operated entirely as a tax reduction, would provide an economic stimulus of from $245,000,000 to $420,000,000 
annually. However, not all of the economic stimulus will accrue to Massachusetts. Based on simulations (for a 
direct stimulus in Missouri) using a "bottom-up" multistate interactive econometric model of the United States 
(developed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the U.S. Department of Commerce), approximately 60 
percent of the economic multiplier accrues to the state in which the stimulus occurs (Ballard, Glickman, and 
Gustely [1980], pages 147-152). Thus, the economic stimulus to Massachusetts from its own RSP program 
should range from $147,000,000 to $252,000,000 annually. Based on simulations using a quarterly econometric 
model of Massachusetts, a tax reduction of from $175,000,000 to $3OO,000,OOO, in 1990 dollars, would yield a 
gain in Massachusetts employment of from 3,200 to 5,500 jobs (Friedlaender, Treyz, and Tresch [ 19751, pages 
503-506). 
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activity of industries specific to Massachusetts. An RSP program will stimulate certain 
industries and cause others to contract. If--as we contend below--the stimulated activities 
are primarily conducted in Massachusetts and the industries adversely affected are 
primarily out-of-state, then recycling standards will have a positive effect on the 
Massachusetts econoay and on employment in Massachusetts (in addition to the positive 
effects related to the social benefits of RSP, previously examined). 
Often discussion of the effects of recycling on a local economy is restricted simply to 
the growth of materials collection and sorting activities,lm usually taking into account the 
loss of economic activity in solid waste disposal. Of course, the effects on economic activity 
of recycling in general, and of an RSP program in particular, will be much broader. 
Packagers will be affected, as will businesses that use packaging. But, most important, 
economic activity will shift from businesses concerned with extracting and processing virgin 
materials to businesses concerned with formulating and processing recycled materials. The 
key issue is how these changes in industrial activity will affect the Massachusetts economy 
and Massachusetts employment. 
Solid waste landfilling and incineration are principally local activities, as are 
materials collection and sorting. However, because the latter activities are much more 
labor intensive, the shift of economic activity in these industries, due to RSP, will create 
additional employment in Massachusetts.121 
The economic activity of businesses in Massachusetts that use packaging has been 
explored in other studies.12 Massachusetts manufacturers using packaging employ as 
many as 629,000 workers; if wholesalers and retailers are included, Massachusetts 
employment !eve!s in these bwinesses rise !e qqxexk"e!y 9W,O!?O jebs. Howewr, m!.~ J 
about 18,000 of these jobs are packaging-related.123 These jobs will not be lost as a result 
I'%ee, for example, B%> (1989), page 7. 
l2lA.n examination of seven recycling programs found that recycling creates 1600 jobs for every million 
tons of solid waste collected and sorted, compared to 600 jobs for landfilling and 80 jobs for incinerating the 
same million tons of solid waste (Environmental Defense Fund [1988], page 18). Since, as estimated earlier, an 
RSP program will result in increased recycling of from 758,000 tons to 1,300,000 tons annually, the net gain in 
Massachusetts employment in these industries should range from 1,OOO to 1,800 jobs. 
12See Tufts University (1988), pages 35-38, and Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc. (1990), pages IV-3 - 
IV-5. 
lDMost of Massachusetts manufacturing employment is in areas that are not packaging-intensive 
(such as machinery and electrical equipment and supplies). Conversely, packaging-intensive industries, such as 
"food and kindred products," are poorly represented in Massachusetts. See Tufts University (1988), pages 36- 
37. 
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of recycling standards,124 although there will be some diversion of job activity to recycled- 
content or recyclable packaging. 
These same studies also examine the packaging industry in Massachusetts, which 
employs approximately 22,000 workers.125 In terms of an RSP program, some of the 
existing packagers in Massachusetts will be positively affected; some negatively.126 
However, the net effect on Massachusetts employment should be sma11.127 
We turn now to the effect on Massachusetts employment of RSP-induced shifts in 
industrial activity from virgin materials extraction and processing to recycled materials 
formulating and processing. The amount of economic activity in Massachuse t t ;  involving 
virgin materials extraction and processing is extremely small. For example, the number of 
Massachusetts jobs in mining and forestry is less than 2000; by comparison, if 
Massachusetts economic activity in these industries were proportional to the national 
average (relative to total employment levels in the state), Massachusetts employment in 
these industries would be approximately 28,000.128 What this means is that the loss of 
economic activity in virgin materials extraction and processing, due to RSP, will have only a 
negligible effect on the Massachusetts economy. (That is, since the number of jobs in 
Massachusetts associated with these industries is so small anyway, there are not many jobs 
to be lost as a result of recycling standards.) Conversely, RSP-induced stimulation of 
recycled materials formulating and processing should have a discernible effect on the 
Massachusetts economy. Because of the relatively high costs of transporting materials, the 
additional separated materials in Massachusetts due to RSP will, for the most part, be 
l L q h e  only exception will be job displacement due to whatever packaging reduction accompanies an 
RS P program. 
l%ee Tufts University (1988), pages 38-40, and Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc. (1990), pages IV-2 - 
IV-3. 
l%e composition of jobs in the packaging industry, by packaging material, in 1986 was paper 
(including paperboard containers), 11,141 (52%); glass, 250 (1%); metal, 1,120 (5%); plastic packaging, 7352 
(33%); and other, 2076 (9%). See Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc. (1990), page IV-2. 
12?Taking into account the possibility of some packaging reduction as we4 the net effect is likely to be 
128Massachusetts employment constitutes approximately 3.2 percent of total employment in the 
United States. However, in the mining and forestry industries, of the total of 865,000 jobs in the United States, 
only 1,800, or approximately .2 percent, are located in Massachusetts. See U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1988a), pages 16-19, and U.S. Department of Commerce (1988b), pages 3-66. 
slightly negative. 
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formulated and processed into recycled materials locally.129 The associated gain in 
Massachusetts employment should be substantial.13 
A detailed accounting of the industrial effects of an RSP program, including 
pertinent secondary and tertiary economic interactions among industries,l31 would require 
a full-fledged input-output analysis.132 However, it should be clear from the previous 
discussion that an RSP program will have a decidedly positive effect on industrial activity in 
Massachusetts-principally due to the stimulative effect of RSP on recycled materials 
formulation and processing activities in the state, with other industrial effects in the state 
being relatively minor and largely cancelling themselves out. 
(4) Other Effects and Co mideratiom 
The preceding analysis has been devoted to forecasting the conomi effects on 
Massachusetts of an RSP program in the state. However, there are broader issues that also 
merit consideration. 
W h e r e  are two reasons why& response to a Massachusetts RSP program-recycling activity will 
take place in Massachusetts rather than elsewhere. First, before investing in local plant and equipment, 
recyclers need to be assured of a steady stream of sorted materials. An RSP program in Massachusetts will 
demonstrate the long-term commitment of the state to work with the recycling industry to sort materials as 
needed to promote recycling. Indeed, as indicated in Part Two of this study, a principal purpose of recycling 
standards is to develop recycling markets for the discarded materials that are collected and sorted in 
Massachusetts. Second, recyclers will be encouraged to use sorted materials from Massachusetts in order to 
satis@ the recyclable packaging materials standard. Again, because of the relatively high cost of transporting 
packaging materials, most recyclers using Massachusetts discards will have to locate in Massachusetts, in order 
to be near the source of the sorted materials. 
mAn RSP program will result in an additional 758,000 tons to 1,300,000 tons of discarded materials 
used in packaging being recycled annually, which equals from 19 percent to 33 percent of the packaging 
materials (paper, glass, plastics, steel, and aluminum) in MSW. If we use employment in mining and forestry as 
a (very) crude approximation of employment in vir* packaging materials extraction and processing and 
further assume that the jobs needed to produce from 758,000 tons to 1,300,000 tons of virgin material are 
diverted, one for one, to jobs to formulate and process recyded materials, then the increase in Massachusetts 
employment in these industries due to RSP will range from approximately 6,000 to 10,OOO jobs. 
131An example of the interindustry effects of an RSP program would include the negative impact on 
the energy sector of shifts from virgin material extraction and processing to recycled material formulation and 
processing, because of the substantially higher energy requirements of the former economic activities (Quigley 
[1988], page 46). Note, however, in this example, that the interindustry impact on the energy sector in 
Massachusetts is likely to be positive because virgin material extraction and processing activities in the state are 
so small relative to the projected Massachusetts gains in recycled material formulation and processing activities. 
132Because of the demanding informational requirements concerning the direct industrial effects of an 
RSP program, an input-output analysis would not be warranted at this point. For an introduction to the 
workings of input-output analysis in a regional setting, see, for example, Heilbrun (1981), pages 170-182. 
63 
First, the issue of recycling is not restricted to Massachusetts. Many other states are 
confronted with immediate and significant solid waste disposal problems that a well- 
conceived recycling program could solve. The successful implementation of recycling 
standards for packaging in Massachusetts would surely provide the impetus for adoption of 
this program in other states. 
Second, in focusing on the major industry-specific effects of an RSP program, we 
may have overlooked, or taken for granted, the more pervasive benefits of recycling 
standards-which will be to reduce materials and production costs throughout the economy 
and thereby to improve the competitiveness of Massachusetts and American industry. By 
recognizing and recapturing the valuable resources contained in our discarded materials, 
the United States will be able to export price-competitive finished products rather than 
solid waste, as it does today.133 
Finally, while it is comforting to know that recycling makes good economic sense, 
much of the public support for recycling transcends dollars and cents. The majority of the 
Massachusetts citizenry is committed to a recycling ethic, and would continue to be even if 
they had to pay extra for products in recyclable packaging.134 For them, solid waste is a 
wasteful, offensive, and simply wrong-headed concept. The solution, independent of cost, 
is to recycle. Recycling standards for packaging are the essential mechanism to make 
recycling work in Massachusetts and to help fuel a successful transition from a throw-away 
society to one that respects and values its resources. Waste is, after all, the visible face of 
industrial inefficiency. 
U5See Kovacs (1988), pages 542-544. 
*ee Martilla and KiIey (1989). For a similar response nationally, see Packuging Magazine (1989). 
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APPENDIX A 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: 
THE NET BENEFITS OF RECYCLING 
Part One of the study develops a point estimate of $231/ton as the net benefit of 
recycling. In this Appendix, we reconsider the key variables influencing the net benefit of 
recycling and allow them to assume a range of possible values. Table A-1 presents the net 
benefits of recycling under these alternative assumptions. Table A-2 presents the change in 
the net benefits of recycling, relative to the baseline value of $23l/ton, under these 
alternative assumptions. In all cases, only one variable is changed at a time.1 
The choice of the range of plausible values we allowed a variable to assume was 
based, where possible, on arguments presented in the text or footnotes in Part One.* In 
other cases, we relied on common or logical ranges for a variable.3 Finally, in the 
remaining cases, where the possible range of values for a variable was unclear, we halved 
and doubled the baseline value to obtain the boundary values.4 The "high" and "low" values 
for each variable were categorized only on the basis of their effects on the net benefits of 
recycling relative to the baseline.5 If an increase in the nominal value of a variable 
decreased the net benefits of recycling, then the upper range of the variable was reported 
as the "low" value, meaning it resulted in the lowest net benefits of recycling. Conversely, if 
a decrease in the nominal value of a variable increased the net benefits of recycling, then 
the lower range of the variable was reported as the "high" value. 
An examination of the last two columns of Table A-1 and Table A-2 indicates how 
robust the $231/ton estimate of the net benefit of recycling is with regard to almost all of 
the variables in question. With only a couple of exceptions, substituting the high and low 
values of a variable in place of the baseline value still results in a net benefit of recycling 
. 
lThe only exception is when a set of variables totals to a fmed value. For example, the composition of 
packaging materials must total to 100 percent. In such situations, the set of variables is grouped together in 
Tables A-1 and A-2. 
*For example, the rationale for having the percentage efficiency of incinerators range from 85% to 
3For example, this was the basis for allowing the real interest rate to vary from 3 percent to 9 percent. 
4For example, taking the baseline cost of $4/ton for material separation equipment, we halved the cost 
%he reason for categorizing the high and low ranges on this basis was to prevent the effects of changes 
95% is provided in a footnote to the text discussion concerning incinerator efficiency. 
to $2/ton and doubled the cost to $8/ton to obtain the range of values. 
in multiple variables, ostensibly in one direction, from cancelling themselves out. 
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I I ,  t 
between $200 and $265. The only variables that the net benefit of recycling is really 
sensitive to are the degree of hazard of the incinerator and the threshold distance (in miles 
from the incinerator) at which households would be indifferent to being further away from 
the incinerator. Even for these variables, the lower bounds for the net benefits of recycling 
are $182 z.nd $146, respectively. 
Finally, we estimated the net benefit of recycling when all the variables were 
assigned their high value and then their low value. Although these results are clearly 
unrealistic (the net benefit in the former case exceeding $10OO/ton), the net benefit of 
recycling Es still positive ($lO/ton) when all of the variables are assigned their lowest 
plausible t alue.6 
OIn this latter case, the total revenue from recycling is estimated to be $19/ton; the avoided subsidy to 
virgin materials, $l/ton; the additional cost of recycling, %/ton; the avoided cost of incineration, %10/ton 
(including $7/ton incinerated for environmental risk and disamenities); and the avoided cost of landfilling, 
$28/ton (including $10/ton landfilled for environmental risk and disamenities). 
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TABLE A-1 
NET BENEFITS OF RECYCLING 
UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
a 
Variable 
Composition of Materials 
Paper 
Glass 
Plastics 
Steel 
Aluminum 
PriceITon of Materials 
Paper 
Glass 
Plastics 
Steel 
Aluminum 
% Subsidy to Virgin Materials 
PricelTon for Virgin Materials 
Real Interest Rate 
CostlTon for Collection Equipment 
CostlTon for Separation Equipment 
Baseline 
53% 
23% 
10% 
13.5% 
. 5 %  
$ 15 
$ 30 
$ 180 
$ 75  
$1170 
2% 
$150 
6% 
$7 
$4 
Operating CostslTon-Material Separation $8 
Share of Recyclables Requiring 
Additional Collection and Separation 
Relative Share of Incin. to Landfill 
Incineration 
Landf ill 
Percentage Efficiency of Incinerators 
Federal Tax Subsidy to Incinerators 
CostITon of Incin. Pollution Control 
(Remedial) 
Operating CostsITon-Incineration 
KWhlTon of Electricity-Incineration 
80 % 
7 0 %  
30% 
90% 
$10 
$6 
$24 
536 
&& 
50% 
25% 
11% 
11% 
3% 
$ 30 
$ 45 
$ 360 
$ 100 
$1340 
3% 
$200 
9% 
$3 
$2 
$4 
70% 
75% 
25 % 
85% 
$20 
$8 
$30 
466 
Low -
65% 
19% 
8% 
7 . 5 %  
. 5 %  
$ 0  
$ 15 
$ 90 
$ 50 
$1000 
1% 
$100 
3% 
$14 
$8 
$16 
90% 
Net Benefit of Recycling 
Low -
$252 $225 
$255 $213 
$232 $229 
$232 $230 
$239 $226 
$234 $224 
$234 $224 
$234 $224 
$235 $226 
$235 $223 
60% 
40% 
95% 
$5 
$18 
606 
$238 $224 
$238 $227 
$233 $228 
$235 $227 
$233 $229 
TABLE A-1 
(Continued) 
Variable Value 
.ow Baseline &&I .- 
Price Per kWh of Electricity $.Ob 
% of Incin. Waste Left as Ash Residue 25% 
Capital CostITon for Ash Transport $7 
Operating CostsITon-Ash Transport $10 
BenefitlMile/Aousehold/Year $412 
$.02 $. 38 
35% 10% 
$14 $3 
$15 $5 
$495 $330 
Distance from Hazardous Waste Facility 
Degree of Hazard of Incinerator 
Threshold Distance (Miles) from Incin. 
. Where Consumer Surplus Ends 
Capital CostslTon for Landfill 
Operating CostITon-Landfill 
Postclosure CostslTon as % of 
Landfill Cap. S Oper. Costs 
Clean-up CostslTon as % of 
Other Landfill Market Costs 
Landfill CostslTon from Stricter Regs. 
as % of Other Landfill Market Costs 
Degree of Hazard of M.S.W. Landfill 
Threshold Distance (Miles) from 
Landfill Where Consumer Surplus Ends 
50% 100% z5 % 
1 0  15  5 
$25 
$35 
15% 
10% 
23% 
25% 
4 
$35 
$40 
20% 
25 % 
30% 
33% 
5 
$15 
$3(1 
10% 
5 %  
20% 
10% 
3 
Net Benefit of Recyclina 
Low &&l -
$238 $216 
$243 $212 
$232 $230 
$232 $230 
$258 $204 
$328 $182 
$462 $146 
$237 
$234 
$232 
S234 
$233 
$212 
$265 
$224 
$228 
$230 
$230 
$230 
$209 
$210 
TABLE A-2 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO THE BASELINE 
OF THE NET BENEFITS OF RECYCLING 
UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
Variable Change From Baseline 
Lov -Lov Baseline !&& -
Composition of Materials 
Paper 
Glass 
Plast ics 
Steel 
Aluminum 
+ $21 - $6 
65% 
19% 
8% 
7.5% 
. 5 %  
53% 
23% 
10% 
13.5% 
. 5 %  
50% 
25% 
11% 
11% 
3% 
PricelTon of Materials 
Paper 
Glass 
Plast ics 
Steel 
Aluminum 
+ $24 - $18 
$ 15 
$ 30 
$ 180 
$ 75 
$1170 
$ 30 
$ 45 
$ 360 
$ 100 
$1340 
% Subsidy to Virgin Materials 2% 3% 1% + $1 - $2 
+ $1 - $1 
+ $8 - $5 
+ $3 - $7 
+ $3 - $7 
+ $3 - $7 
+ $4 - $5 
PricelTon for Virgin Materials $150 $200 $100 
Real Interest Rate 6% 9% 3% 
CostITon for Collection Equipment $7 $3 $14 
Costilon for Separation Equipment $4 $2 $8 
Operating CostslTon-Material Separation $8 Sl6 
Share of Recyclables Requiring 80% 
Additional Collection and Separation 
70% 90 % 
Relative Share of Incin. to Landfill 
Inclneration 70% 
* Landfill 30% 
+ $4 - $8 
75% 
25 % 
60% 
40% 
Percentage Efficiency of Incinerators 90% 
" 
Federal Tax Subsidy to Incinerators $10 
85% 95% + $7 - $7 
+ $7 - $4 
+ $2 - $3 
$20 $5 
CostlTon of Incin. Pollution Control $6 
(Remedial ) 
$8 $4 
Operating CortslTon-Incineration $24 S30 $18 + $4 - $4 
+ $2 - $2 KWhlTon of Electricity-Incineration 536 466 606 
TABLE A-2 
(Continued) 
V i r  fa b 1 e Value 
Baseline w 4sl? 
Price Per kWh of Electricity $ . O b  $. 02 S.08 
X of Incin. Waste Left as Ash Residue 25% 35% 10% 
Capital CostITon for Ash Transport $7 $1 4 $3 
Operating CostslTon-Ash Transport $10 $15 $5 
BenafitlMile/Rousehold/Year $412 
Distance for Hazardous Waste Facility 
Degree of Hazard of Incinerator 50% 
Threshold Distance (Miles) from Incin. 10 
Where Consumer Surplus Ends 
Capital CostsITon for Landfill $25 
Operating CostlTon-Landfill $35 
Postclosure CostaITon as % of 15% 
Landfill Cap. 6 Oper. Costs 
CleaA-up CostsITon as % of 10% 
Other Landfill Market Costs 
Landfill Costs/Ton from Stricter Regs. 23% 
as % of Other Landfill Market Costs 
Degree of Hazard of M.S.W. Landfill 25% 
Threshold Distance (Miles) from 4 
Landfill Where Consumer Surplus Ends 
$495 $330 
100% 
15 
$35 
$40 
20 % 
25 % 
30% 
33% 
5 
25 % 
5 
$15 
$30 
10% 
5% 
20% 
10% 
3 
Net Benefit of Recycling 
Lov 
+ $7 - $15 
+ $12 - $19 
+ $1 - $1 
+ $1 - $1 
+ $27 - $27 
+ $97 - $49 
+ $231 - $85 
+ $6 - $7 
+ $3 - $3 
+ $1 - $1 
+ $3 - $1 
+ $2 - $1 
+ $11 - $22 
+ $34 - $21 
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